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Effective with publication of this issue, the INFANTRY SCHOOL QUARTERLY is designated the official publication of The Infantry School and will replace THE MAILING LIST. The Quarterly will be published in July, October, January, and April.

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The mission of this publication is:

(1) To disseminate official doctrine governing employment of Infantry as soon as it is evolved at The Infantry School and approved by the War Department.

(2) To provide officers in the field with current information pertaining to tactics, technique, equipment, and organization at the earliest possible moment.

(3) To distribute information regarding instructional methods and techniques and training aids to infantry personnel.

(4) To reproduce combat narratives which have definite historical value and contain an academic evaluation of combat lessons.

U.S. Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

INFANTRY SCHOOL QUARTERLY

A compilation of instructional matter prepared at The Infantry School and published quarterly

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Containing the Latest Thought on Infantry

Volume XXXI, Number 1

Prepared by the Academic Department of The Infantry School by direction of Major General John W. O'Daniel, Commandant, and under the supervision of Brigadier General W. P. Shepard, Assistant Commandant

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PREFACE

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Infantry Organization

As a logical sequence to World War II, all components of the Armed Forces have examined in retrospect, the errors made and lessons learned during prosecution of the war. Hindsight has indicated that although the organization of the components of the Armed Forces was reasonably efficient during the early phases of the war, constant reorganization was necessary on all command levels to continue the war to a successful conclusion.

Development of new weapons or improvement of old ones by the enemy required changes or modifications in organization as well as tactics to counter the new threat. By the same token, development of new weapons or utilization of old weapons in a new role by our own Armed Forces required readjustments in organization to realize the maximum benefit.

The War Department recognized that certain deficiencies existed in the organization of all lower echelons. While the war was in progress, teams were sent to all theatres of operations to interview battle-experienced officers and to get first hand information as to the actual organizational requirements. This information, plus information voluntarily submitted by experienced officers, was compiled and studied. The result of this study was that the War Department directed that each of the major commands inquire into its own organization with a view to evolving a more efficient organizational doctrine.

In June 1946, the Infantry Conference, consisting of battle-experienced infantry officers from all theatres of operations, qualified officers from the major commands, and civilian technical experts, was convened at The Infantry

School to determine what specific modifications were necessary within the Infantry. The basic conclusion reached by this conference was that *a new organizational doctrine must be evolved for Infantry that would permit interior flexibility to meet everchanging battle conditions.* Guided by this premise, the conference made specific recommendations to the War Department that required modifications in organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for all infantry units from the rifle squad to the infantry division.

Tables of organization and equipment recently published by the War Department have taken cognizance of the basic conclusion reached by the Conference regarding an organizational doctrine that permits flexibility, and also have incorporated many of the specific changes recommended by the conference to obtain flexibility.

With these generalities in mind, then, let us see what changes have been made in order to obtain a flexible organization. Consider first, the infantry squad. (See Chart 1.) Recall that the old-type squad organization consisted of 12 men including a staff sergeant squad leader, sergeant assistant squad leader, corporal automatic rifleman, assistant automatic rifleman, ammunition bearer, and seven riflemen. There are two prevalent concepts as to the proper mission and composition of an infantry rifle squad. First, a rifle squad is the smallest combat unit, consisting of only as many men as one leader can control in the field. And second, a rifle squad is the smallest combat unit under one leader which can be employed tactically—that is to utilize within itself a base of fire force and a maneuver force to gain an objective. These two concepts are divergent. Each requires different squad organization. If the first definition as stated—that is, a rifle squad is the smallest combat unit consisting of only as many men as one leader can control in the field—is accepted, it was proved, particularly in the past war, that the present rifle squad is too large. One leader could not control 12 men, and rapid dissipation of infantry fighting power through

straggling resulted from his inability to do so. Tests have proved that one leader can effectively control no more than eight men in the field. Such a force may be employed as a base of fire force or a maneuver force, but not both simultaneously, since such action requires the use of subordinate units and thus violates the concept of the definition. Also, because of the small initial strength, combat losses would soon render ineffective both the base of fire group and the maneuver group. If the second definition is accepted—that is, the squad is the smallest unit which can be employed tactically utilizing fire and maneuver—we must, in effect, create two smaller groups each requiring a leader. What are we going to call these groups? In other words, where are we going to start from? As a result of study and tests, it has been concluded that we shall accept the first definition for our rifle squad and employ it in such a manner that it can be controlled by one leader.

Consider the new squad organization. Notice that it is composed of nine men, consisting of a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, an automatic rifle team of two men, and five riflemen. The present thought is that this squad will be employed as a base of fire force *or* as a maneuver force, but not both simultaneously. Do not confuse a maneuver with movement. The squad advances by fire and movement, usually with the automatic rifle team covering the advance of the riflemen and vice versa. This is not maneuver when we think of maneuver requiring, as a rule, two distinct forces, a base of fire force and a maneuver force, each under its own command. It is merely an advance in one direction as a team, part of the squad firing while the remainder is advancing, and all elements remaining under the direct control of one leader. The immediate question comes to mind now, as to what has happened to the scouts? War experience proved that the concept of having two individuals in a squad highly trained as scouts and employed constantly on that mission was fallacious. The casualty problem was such that a squad could not expect to retain its trained scouts for any great period



CHART 1.—Organization of the rifle squad and platoon.

of time. The present thought is that a squad when operating alone, secures itself initially by members of the squad observing in all directions. When a dangerous locality is approached, a squad leader may direct one or more riflemen, designated as the security element, to investigate this area. Having accomplished this mission, the security element rejoins its squad or performs such other missions as the squad leader directs. When danger to the front is continuously imminent, the squad leader may require the security element to precede the squad. Notice the flexibility of this system. The squad leader has available for his security element any or all of his five riflemen, which he may use as the situation requires. All riflemen are trained to accomplish duties such as we formerly considered the duty of the scouts.

Changes in the rifle platoon have effected increases in both firepower and maneuverability. Notice that the old rifle platoon consisted simply of the headquarters of three rifle squads. Employment in the past war required the habitual attachment of machine guns, and at times other heavy weapons, to the platoon to make it effective. Since World War I, and with German thought influencing our own, we have come to accept the machine gun as an effective offensive weapon as well as a defensive one. Since World War I we have gotten away from the thought of employing machine guns habitually as indirect fire weapons, and now use them habitually as direct fire weapons with the assault echelons in an attack situation. Obviously then, for this purpose they must be employed with a rifle platoon. Our new organization provides for this type of employment. Notice that there are four squads—three rifle squads and a weapons squad—in addition to the platoon headquarters. The weapons squad contains a light machine gun and a rocket launcher. *Here is where fire and maneuver commences, and here has been concentrated the weapons of close combat to do the job.* The platoon can establish a base of fire with one or more squads and its weapons squad, and maneuver with the remainder of the



CHART 2.—Organization of the rifle company.

① Strength of rifle squad reduced from 12 to 9 men; AR team included in each squad.

② Weapons squad (added) armed with one LMG and one rocket launcher.

platoon. The weapons squad can be employed totally or partially with the base of fire or with the maneuver force. The addition of the machine gun to the rifle platoon has simplified the employment of this weapon with the platoon inasmuch as it will be an organic part of it, habitually trained with it, and always available.

The overall organization of the rifle company has not changed materially. There is, as formerly, a company headquarters, the weapons platoon, and three rifle platoons. The old weapons platoon was a pretty conglomerate outfit, consisting of the platoon headquarters, a special weapons section equipped with 57-mm recoilless rifles, an assault section equipped with 2.36-inch rocket launchers, a 60-mm mortar section, and a light machine-gun section. Our new organization simplifies the weapons platoon. Notice that the rocket launchers and the light machine guns have been assigned to the rifle platoons, and remaining are the platoon headquarters, the mortar section, and the 57-mm rifle section. This has resulted in reducing by three the number of rocket launchers, but has added one light machine gun to the rifle company, inasmuch as there were only two formerly and there is now one in each platoon. The 57-mm rifles and 60-mm mortars remain unchanged at three each. By placing the light machine guns and rocket launchers in the rifle platoons, we have placed the weapons where they are normally employed. This system does away with the old system of habitual attachment and will simplify training and tactical employment, and thus increase effectiveness.

The principal change in the heavy weapons company is the withdrawal of one heavy machine gun platoon thereby reducing the number of machine guns in the heavy weapons company by 4 HMG's and 4 LMG's. This is offset to some degree, however, by the addition of one machine gun in each rifle company. The 81-mm mortar platoon has been reduced by one mortar section cutting down the number of mortars from six to four. Experience has shown that ammunition supply difficulties in combat were such



CHART 3.—Organization of the heavy weapons company.

that four 81-mm mortars were all that could be kept firing under normal circumstances. In addition, the increased range of the new 81-mm mortar (4400 vs 3290 yards) makes it possible to obtain almost the same area coverage with two dispersed sections as could formerly be obtained by three sections spread across the battalion front. Our 75-mm gun platoon has also been reduced by two guns from six to four. Notice too, that the platoon is organized into a platoon headquarters and two gun sections instead of a platoon headquarters and three gun squads as formerly. What was formerly called a squad is now called a section, the number of men and guns remaining unchanged.

Changes in the infantry battalion headquarters and headquarters company are the addition of an intelligence section composed of two intelligence squads of four men each, a reinforcement of the communication platoon by four men, and the addition of one officer, (assistant S-3) to the battalion headquarters. The ammunition and pioneer platoon remains the same. The battalion headquarters section has been slightly reduced in enlisted personnel.

Consider next the changes in organization of the separate regimental companies. Formerly, the infantry regiment had a cannon company, an antitank company, a service company, and the headquarters and headquarters company. Attached to the regiment was a medical detachment which operated the battalion and regimental aid stations and provided litter service. Notice that a heavy mortar company and a heavy tank company have replaced the antitank and cannon companies; and a medical company, now organic, not attached, has replaced the medical detachment.

Most infantrymen are aware of the fact that a company of 4.2-inch chemical mortars habitually supported an infantry regiment during the past war. This weapon proved its effectiveness as an infantry support weapon and was widely used for close-in destruction fires and smoke missions. Since its use was so universal, the conviction grew

that this company should become an organic part of the infantry regiment to facilitate training and team work. The cannon company with its present type weapon failed to justify itself. The occasions were rare when cannon company indirect fire could not be fired more effectively by direct support artillery in shorter time and with greater intensity. The cannon company weapon was unsuitable for direct fire missions, consequently it has been abolished.

As a result of combat experiences, ideas on the suitable type infantry antitank weapon and its method of employment have also undergone some change. The consensus now is that tanks must be able to fight tanks and should mount guns of sufficient caliber and muzzle velocity to enable them to effectively accomplish this mission. This is particularly true of infantry tanks, that is, those tanks which operate habitually in close support of foot troops. By replacing the old antitank company with a heavy tank company we are killing two birds with one stone. First, we are providing the infantry with a suitable, mobile, antitank gun, and second, we are providing the infantry with a tank capable of performing the normal armored and assault gun missions.

The medical company, which is organic, performs the same missions as the medical detachment and, in addition, operates a regimental collecting station, formerly manned by a collecting company in the division medical battalion. By making this company organic to the regiment, some of the medical administrative and command problems which formerly existed have been simplified.

The service company has not changed materially, as far as its functions are concerned. The personnel who habitually work in the regimental headquarters and were assigned to the regimental headquarters section in service company are, in the new organization, assigned to the regimental headquarters and headquarters company where they obviously belong. Also a graves registration section with one officer and five men has been added.



CHART 4.—Organization of the infantry regiment.

The regimental headquarters and headquarters company remains pretty much the same except that a military police platoon with one officer and thirty-four men has been added. This was a unit which combat proved necessary and most regiments organized one on a provisional basis. Note also the counterfire section and the air section. These units are in our present organization but have been added since the war.

As to changes in the divisional units, consider first the division artillery. The two major changes are briefly as follows: first, there will be six guns in each battery instead of four, and second, a self-propelled antiaircraft battalion, armed with automatic weapons, will become an additional organic battalion in the division artillery.

The argument for and against four and six-gun batteries has waxed hot and heavy among artillerymen for many years.[1] The four-gun advocates argued that they would rather have an additional battery for purposes of flexibility rather than increase the number of guns in any battery. Also, they felt—and this argument does have considerable merit—that four guns would be able to shoot all of the available ammunition anyway. However, the six-gun advocates maintained that increasing the guns per battery saved overhead that would result from the organization of additional batteries, and that flexibility is taken care of by present artillery fire direction center methods. Many of them proved their point during the war by adding two guns to their batteries, and fighting them very successfully as six-gun batteries in spite of table of organization restrictions. In any event, the six-gun advocates now have the upper hand, and actually most artillerymen feel that this is the most desirable form of organization. The addition

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[1]The principle of including six guns in an artillery battery is not new. You may recall the action considered to be the turning point in the First Battle of Bull Run when Rickett's Battery I, First Field Artillery, and Griffin's Battery D, Second Field Artillery, were silenced by Confederate infantry fire after occupying exposed positions on Henry House Hill. Both of these batteries were six-gun batteries.



CHART 5.—Organization of the infantry division.

① Antiaircraft battalion (AW) added to division artillery. Each firing battery equipped with six guns instead of four.

② One company of combat engineers added.

③ Consists of an ambulance company and a clearing company. Collecting companies relegated to regimental medical company level.

of the antiaircraft battalion is felt desirable inasmuch as the attachment of an antiaircraft unit to a division was almost habitual during the past war, and the need for antiaircraft protection in a division area will always exist.

Note the addition of a heavy tank battalion to the infantry division. Here again, experience has proved the universal need of tanks with foot troops. Divisions habitually had a separate tank battalion attached during the past war, but to facilitate team work and combined training of this unit, the battalion has now been made an organic part of the infantry division.

The major change in the engineer combat battalion is the addition of one more engineer combat company. Here again we had the old argument against loss of flexibility by the committment of engineer troops to a definite area. Some people feel that with a given number of engineer troops to begin with, it is best to organize them into separate battalions and employ them as the engineer situation dictates. Others argue that this is all well and good, but that in no case was the present division engineer battalion able to accomplish division engineer tasks without reinforcements, and as a consequence, troops from the separate engineer battalions were habitually employed on reinforcing missions to assist them. By making a portion of these supporting engineers organic, training and team work would again be facilitated. The solution of four companies in the engineer combat battalion is a good one in that it does permit two companies to be attached or to function in direct support of two assault regiments, and still allow the division engineer to retain a sizeable force under his control for division engineer tasks.

With the regimental medical companies taking over the operation of the medical collecting stations, we find, of course, some change in the division medical battalion. Where at present we have three collecting companies and a clearing company, we will have one ambulance company and a clearing company. The ambulance company evacuates direct from the regimental collecting points to the clearing

company. In effect, we will have the function of the present collecting company, that of establishing and manning the collecting point and evacuating to the clearing station, split between the regimental medical companies and the ambulance company. The clearing company will now have three platoons instead of two.

Another major change in our infantry division is the addition of a replacement company. Many divisions during the past war organized such a unit on a provisional basis to permit more efficient handling and better integration of replacements once they arrive in the division area. The present system of having a supporting replacement battalion behind several divisions does not allow the division commander the opportunity to indoctrinate and train replacements in the battle area before moving them into combat. This results in excessive casualties among newly arrived personnel. Any machinery which the division commander can set up for this purpose draws personnel away from the job which they should be doing. The division replacement company will give the division commander a small reservoir for replacements. This organization should do much, both to insure a steadier flow to combat units and to reduce the mental shock which results when an individual is moved rapidly from comparative security into the uncertainties of combat.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the war and peace division will vary considerably in composition. From the point of view of economy, such a procedure is highly desirable. Obviously, many units which are indispensable in war time have no peacetime function. The replacement company and the graves registration sections are examples. In addition, because of personnel limitations, the strength of the peacetime division must be pared. The new tables of organization provide for this in such a manner that rapid expansion of the peace strength division to war strength can be accomplished without undue loss of efficiency.

Flexibility has been the governing principle in the design of all elements of the new division. It is recognized that in individual situations certain elements may need reinforcement to accomplish their assigned mission. When such is the case, the skeleton is there. Reinforcement can be accomplished with a minimum amount of administrative difficulties and without reorganization.

Combat Formations and Exercises for the Rifle Squad and Platoon

FOREWORD

The redesign of military organizations which almost invariably follows a war is an excellent reaction if such changes reflect the lessons of combat and contemplate the needs of the future. With this premise in mind, the officers attending the Infantry Conference in June 1946, conducted an exhaustive study of the organization of the infantry rifle squad and platoon. After extensive deliberation, the following conclusions and recommendations were forwarded to the War Department:

1. *Conclusion.* The twelve-man squad is unwieldy. Therefore, it does not adhere to the basic requirement that a squad should contain only as many men as a leader can control in the field.

Recommendation. The rifle squad should be organized into a tactical unit of a leader and eight men.

2. *Conclusion.* Elements of a rifle squad are not capable of conducting independent maneuver. Maneuver is generally understood to mean the movement by a portion of a unit for a considerable distance. The term should be applied to an entire sub-unit rather than a portion of a subunit. Maneuver, as just defined, seldom occurred within the rifle squad; rarely did the squad leader employ the Able, Baker, Charlie team principle in directing the action of his unit.

Recommendation. The rifle squad should be the smallest unit deemed capable of executing an independent maneuver. They should advance by fire and movement, individuals moving under cover of fire of the remaining members. No

division should be made within the squad for a base of fire element and a maneuver element.

3. *Conclusion.* The time honored term "scouts" is misleading. Platoon scouts were rarely employed in combat to provide security for the platoon. The practice of designating individuals to precede a unit was not followed; rather, an entire sub-unit operating under a leader was usually detailed to provide the required security.

Recommendation. All rifle squads should be trained to function as security squads and employed to provide security for a rifle platoon when so designated.

4. *Conclusion.* In combat, the normal employment of certain elements of the weapons platoon was to attach the light machine-gun section and a rocket launcher to a rifle platoon.

Recommendation. A fourth squad, designated as a weapons squad, consisting of a light machine-gun team and a rocket launcher team, should be made organic to the rifle platoon.

With the incorporation of these recommendations into the Tables of Organization and Equipment, it becomes necessary to revise the combat formations of the rifle squad and platoon and to place this phase of training in its proper place in the training cycle. Upon completion of "training of the individual soldier," the basic fundamentals of combat formations, combat drill, are taught on the parade ground. As proficiency is attained, the training proceeds to combat exercises conducted on varied terrain where the drill can be applied to simulated battlefield conditions. In this stage, control as well as application of specific formations is emphasized. Upon completion of this phase, the unit is prepared to engage in tactical training.

Section 1

GENERAL

1. INTRODUCTION. The purpose of the following drills and exercises is to develop a uniform and efficient method of instruction in battlefield formations, tactics, and control

of small units. The formations are designed specifically for the rifle squad and platoon as organized under TO & E 7-17, December 1946. Interpretation and adaptation should be based on the following principles:

a. Individuals in a rifle squad fight by *fire and movement.*

b. Fire and maneuver begins at the platoon level as the platoon is the smallest unit capable of employing one or more of its elements in maneuver.

c. All ground combat units employ security.

2. GENERAL. *a.* Training in utilization of combat formations is divided into two phases; combat drill and combat exercises. Flexibility of the combat formations is stressed in the sections which deal with combat exercises.

b. Combat drill comprises the preliminary instruction necessary to teach the squad and platoon basic formations, movements, and control.

c. Combat exercises are conducted in the field for the primary purpose of teaching the squad and platoon to adapt the formations and movements previously learned in combat drill to varied terrain. It includes training in simple tactical movements of the squad and maneuvers of the platoon in offensive action, reorganization, defensive action, and withdrawal.

Section 2

COMBAT DRILL: RIFLE SQUAD

3. GENERAL. The following general rules are prescribed:

a. Instruction is conducted at ease. Precision and discipline are stressed.

b. Initial training is conducted at a walk on open terrain, such as a parade ground. As soon as individuals understand the formations, the tempo is speeded up progressively until movements are being executed at a run.

c. For drill purposes, the normal interval and distance between men is approximately 5 paces. This interval and distance may be varied.

d. In this phase of instruction, the squad leader will give oral commands accompanied by appropriate arm-and-hand signals. See figure 1.

e. Duties within the squad should be rotated frequently in order to promote interest and teach all individuals the entire drill.

f. In executing all movements, the rifle or automatic rifle is carried at port arms. When halted, riflemen come to order arms, the automatic riflemen sling arms, and all individuals remain at ease.

g. During all drills, the squad leader may leave his normal position in the formation and place himself where he can best exercise control.

h. Members of the squad base their positions and movements on the number two man unless otherwise directed by the squad leader.

4. COMPOSITION. *a.* The rifle squad is composed of the squad leader, No. 1; five riflemen, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6; an automatic rifleman, No. 7; an assistant automatic rifleman, No. 8; and an assistant squad leader, No. 9. The automatic rifleman and his assistant are herein referred to as the AR team.

b. The weapons squad is composed of the squad leader, No. 1; the LMG gunner, No. 2; assistant LMG gunner, No. 3; LMG ammunition bearers, Nos. 4 and 5; the rocket-launcher gunner, No. 6; assistant rocket launcher gunner, No. 7; rocket launcher ammunition bearers, Nos. 8 and 9.

NOTE - The weapons squad executes combat drill in a manner similar to that of the rifle squad. Those formations that are not applicable due to difference in weapons and roles are omitted.

5. OBSERVATION AND CONTROL. The squad provides observation to the front, flanks, and rear at all times.

a. When halted, individuals face and observe as indicated in figures 2 and 3.

b. While moving, individuals observe in the directions indicated in figures 2 and 3.



FIGURE 1.—Arm-and-hand signals.



FIGURE 2.—Squad column.

6. FORMATIONS. *a.* Being in any formation, the rifle squad is trained to assume the following formations by oral command and/or arm-and-hand signals:

(1) Squad column (see figure 2).
(2) Diamond formation (see figure 3).
(3) As skirmishers (see figure 4).
(4) As skirmishers, AR right (see figure 5①).
(5) As skirmishers, AR left (see figure 5②).



FIGURE 3.—Diamond formation.

b. To form squad column, the squad leader commands: 1. SQUAD COLUMN; 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, number 2 moves forward 30 paces and all individuals assume the positions shown in figure 2. In both squad column and the squad diamond formation, even numbered men go to the right and odd numbered men to the left of the squad leader.

c. To form squad diamond, the squad leader commands: 1. SQUAD DIAMOND, 2. MOVE.



FIGURE 4.—As skirmishers.

At the command MOVE, number 2, moves forward 15 paces and all individuals assume the positions shown in figure 3.

d. To form as skirmishers, the squad leader commands: 1. AS SKIRMISHERS, 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, each individual assumes the positions shown in figure 4.

e. To form as skirmishers, AR right, the squad leader commands:

1. AS SKIRMISHERS, AR RIGHT, 2. MOVE.



FIGURE 5①.—As skirmishers, AR right.



②.—As skirmishers, AR left.

At the command MOVE, all individuals assume the positions shown in figure 5①. To form as skirmishers with the AR team on the left, the commands are:

1. AS SKIRMISHERS, AR LEFT, 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, individuals assume the positions shown in figure 5②.

7. CHANGING FORMATIONS WHILE MOVING. After the squad has been trained to assume formations promptly, training in movement is initiated. The squad is trained to move in any direction and, while moving, to change from one deployed formation to another upon command and signal of the squad leader. Training progresses until a dispersed and disorganized squad is able to assume a combat formation promptly upon a command and signal indicating the direction it is to face and the desired formation. The squad may move as a unit, by groups, or by individuals. Movement may be by rushes, by walking, or by crawling.

a. Being in any formation at a halt, to move the squad forward, the squad leader commands and signals, FORWARD. When the command has been given, the squad moves forward, basing its rate and direction of movement upon that of the squad leader.

b. Being in formation, to move the entire squad, the squad leader commands and signals:

1. PREPARE TO MOVE, 2. FOLLOW ME.

(1) At the preparatory command, PREPARE TO MOVE, all members of the squad get ready to move promptly and watch the squad leader for further commands and signals.

(2) At the command of execution, FOLLOW ME, they move at the same rate and in the same direction as the squad leader and maintain their same relative positions in the formation.

c. To halt the squad, the squad leader commands and signals, HALT or DOWN.

(1) At the command HALT, the squad halts.

(2) At the command DOWN, members of the squad assume firing positions.

(3) When members of the squad halt or assume firing positions, they face in the direction of observation prescribed for the formation which they are in when the command is given.

d. Being in any formation, the squad leader may move individuals or small groups by designating:

(1) The individuals or group to move.

(2) The distance and direction they are to move.

(3) The type of movement.

If moving by individual or group rushes, individuals or groups execute each rush on command of the squad leader.

e. To assemble the deployed squad, the squad leader commands and signals, ASSEMBLE. Individuals move at a run and assemble in rear of the squad leader in column formation.

Section 3

COMBAT DRILL: RIFLE PLATOON

8. GENERAL. The rules for platoon combat drill are, in general, the same as for squad combat drill. The platoon deploys with sufficient interval and/or distance between squads to permit maneuver. The normal interval and distance between squads is as shown in figure 5. The arm-and-hand signal, PLATOON, need not precede arm-and-hand signals for the platoon, it being assumed that signals given by the platoon leader are intended for the entire platoon unless preceded by the arm-and-hand signal, SQUAD. As with the squad, oral commands, accompanied by appropriate arm-and-hand signals, will be employed in this phase of instruction. See figure 6.

9. CONDUCT OF DRILL. Combat drill for the rifle platoon is designed to teach the relative positions of the squads in the platoon formations. It is performed on the parade ground so that each member of the squad will be able to observe the overall picture of each formation. For purposes of the drill, the distances and intervals between squads are fixed, although they may be altered to conform to the size of the parade ground available. It must be understood, however, that when using these formations over varied terrain, the distances and intervals between squads must be flexible in order to take advantage of the terrain and the assumed enemy situation. The drill will be conducted *at ease,* with the squads moving at a run when changing formations.



FIGURE 6.—Arm-and-hand signals.

10. COMPOSITION. *a.* For combat drill, squads within the rifle platoon are referred to as follows: first squad, second squad, third squad, and weapons squad.

b. Succession of command within the rifle platoon is normally the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, the platoon guide, and squad leaders in the order of rank.

11. FORMATIONS. *a.* Being in any formation, the platoon is taught to assume the following basic formations:

(1) Tactical column. (see figure 7①.)
(2) Platoon column. (see figure 7②.)
(3) Platoon line. (see figure 7③.)
(4) Platoon vee. (see figure 7④.)
(5) Platoon wedge. (see figure 7⑤.)
(6) Platoon echelon right or left. (see figure 7⑥.)

b. Unless otherwise designated by the platoon leader, the leading or right leading rifle squad is always the base squad, except that when three squads are abreast, the center rifle squad becomes the base squad. Within each platoon formation, squads base their position and regulate their direction and rate of advance on the base squad.

c. Being in tactical column formation, to deploy the platoon into any other combat drill formation, the leading squad deploys as the base squad of the formation. The other squads move to their respective positions in the formation.

d. To form tactical column, the platoon leader commands and signals:

1. TACTICAL COLUMN, 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, the platoon forms as shown in figure 7①.

e. To form platoon column, the platoon leader commands and signals:

1. PLATOON COLUMN, 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, the platoon forms as shown in figure 7②.

f. To form platoon line, the platoon leader commands and signals:

1. PLATOON LINE, 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, the platoon forms as shown in figure 7③.

g. To form platoon vee, the platoon leader commands and signals:

1. PLATOON VEE, 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, the platoon forms as shown in figure 7④.



FIGURE 7.—Platoon formations.



FIGURE 7.—Platoon formations (continued).

h. To form platoon wedge, the platoon leader commands and signals:

1. PLATOON WEDGE, 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, the platoon forms as shown in figure 7⑤.

i. To form platoon echelon right (left), the platoon leader commands and signals:

1. PLATOON ECHELON, RIGHT (LEFT), 2. MOVE.

At the command MOVE, the platoon forms as shown in figure 7⑥.

12. MOVEMENT. After the platoon has been trained to assume the basic formations promptly on command, it is trained to move, and while moving, to change from one deployed formation to another as shown in figure 8. The rules for moving and halting are, in general, the same as for the squad. In changing from one deployed formation to another, the base squad sometimes changes in order to conform to the rule set forth in paragraph 11*b*. This takes place upon completion of the movement. For instance, in changing from platoon vee to platoon line, the right leading rifle squad remains the base squad until the line formation is completed. The center rifle squad then becomes the base squad. To form platoon echelon from any formation, the rules for forming platoon column apply.

13. OBSERVATION AND CONTROL. *a.* The responsibiltity of each squad within the platoon for observation to the front, flanks, and rear remains unchanged in platoon combat drill.

b. Squad leaders observe and control their respective squads and maintain visual contact with the platoon leader.

c. The platoon leader places himself in such a position as to best control the platoon.

d. The platoon sergeant assists the platoon leader in the control of the platoon and assumes command in his absence. His position in the formations is not fixed; he goes whereever he can best perform his duties.

e. The platoon guide normally takes a position in the rear of the platoon and assists in control.



FIGURE 8.—Changing platoon formations.
① Platoon column to platoon line.
② Platoon line to platoon column.





③ Platoon column to platoon vee.
④ Platoon vee to platoon column.



⑤ Platoon column to platoon wedge.

⑥ Platoon wedge to platoon column.

⑦ Platoon line to platoon vee.

⑧ Platoon vee to platoon line.



⑨ Platoon line to platoon wedge.

⑩ Platoon wedge to platoon line.

⑪ Platoon vee to platoon wedge.

⑫ Platoon wedge to platoon vee.

f. Only one messenger will be used in platoon combat drill; the other is available for use by the company commander. In drill, messengers should be rotated for training purposes.

14. TRANSITION. Having become proficient in assuming the basic formations and changing from one formation to another, the platoon is ready for training in combat exercises over varied terrain, as described in Section 5.

Section 4

COMBAT EXERCISES: RIFLE SQUAD

15. GENERAL. After individuals and units have become proficient in assuming the formations and have learned the movements of combat drill, training in combat exercises is initiated.

16. CONDUCT OF TRAINING. The purpose of training in combat exercises is to facilitate the transition from combat drill to squad tactics. The exercises are conducted on varied terrain so that leaders and units will have an opportunity to put into practical application, the formations and movements learned in combat drill. The duties of leaders and individuals and the advantages and disadvantages of the various formations are covered. Training is conducted in the same manner as combat drill with the following exceptions:

a. The squad leader prescribes the initial formation. Thereafter he may vary the formation in order to make the best use of ground, cover, and concealment.

b. Fixed distances and intervals are not prescribed. Troops are taught to vary distances between individuals and units depending upon ease of control, visibility, and terrain. Straight lines are avoided in all formations.

c. The direction or location of the assumed enemy position is indicated by the squad leader before the exercise starts.

17. FIRE AND MOVEMENT. *a. General.* Squad combat exercises are begun by teaching individuals and groups the method of moving while under fire, or when close to the enemy. They are taught to combine fire and movement so that the movement of each individual or group is covered by the fire of the remainder of the squad. Whenever the squad is exposed to fire, (whether real or simulated) *all movement must be covered* by fire. If targets cannot be seen, individuals direct their fire at the places which would most likely conceal the enemy. During combat exercises, blank ammunition may be fired to make the training realistic. If blank ammunition is not available, firing is simulated. The use of well-trained personnel to represent the enemy adds realism to the exercises. In the event that personnel are not available, the enemy position may be represented by silhouette targets, firecrackers, and/or other noise-making devices.

b. Target designation. Leaders may designate targets by voice. When this is not practicable, targets are designated by pointing in the direction of the target and signaling the range.

c. Fire control. (1) To open fire, the squad leader, after having designated the target and range, signals, COMMENCE FIRING. All men set their sights at the range indicated and fire at the designated target at the normal rate of fire.

(2) To increase or decrease the rate of fire, the squad leader signals, FIRE FASTER (SLOWER). When part of the squad is advancing or is exposed to enemy observation and fire, the remaining men automatically increase their rate of fire.

d. Fire during movement. When the squad is firing, individuals or groups ordered to move, suspend firing at the preparatory signal or command for movement. As soon as the move is completed, they resume firing immediately.

e. Assault fire. Assault fire is fire delivered by individuals during the final assault on a hostile position. Individuals rise and advance at a rapid walk, firing from the

shoulder or hip. To move the squad forward employing assault fire, the squad leader commands:

1. ASSAULT FIRE, 2. FOLLOW ME.

At the command ASSAULT FIRE, individuals fix bayonets, resume fire, and prepare to move forward. At the command FOLLOW ME, all members of the squad rise and move forward, firing. They regulate their rate of movement on the squad leader.

18. DUTIES OF SQUAD LEADER AND ASSISTANT SQUAD LEADER. *a.* The squad leader commands the squad.

(1) When approaching the enemy, he normally places himself in rear of the leading elements of his squad so that he may best:

(a) Select the route the squad will use in moving forward.

(b) Direct the employment of his security elements (see paragraph 19) to prevent surprise.

(c) Determine which formation will favor control, permit the maximum fire in any direction, and afford the greatest amount of protection from enemy observation and fire. A change in formation may be necessary to meet changing conditions of terrain, enemy fire, visibility, etc.

(2) When the security elements of the squad locate the enemy position or are fired upon, the leader orders the squad to take cover and makes a hasty visual reconnaissance to determine:

(a) The best route of approach to the enemy position.

(b) The most favorable position from which an attack can be launched.

(c) The location from which the AR team can best engage the enemy.

(3) The leader then issues the attack order and by commands or signals, directs the squad to take firing positions.

(4) When all men are in position, the squad leader launches the attack. The assistant squad leader commands the AR team. The squad leader places himself where he can best control the fire of the entire squad but does not enter the fire fight except in an emergency. In all squad

combat exercises, the location of the squad leader in any formation is not fixed; he goes where he can best exercise control over the squad.

(5) In the attack, the squad leader advances his squad by fire and movement. He directs certain individuals or groups to move under cover of the fire of the remainder of the squad. This is continued until the squad is within assaulting distance of the enemy position. The assault is normally delivered at the earliest moment which promises success and without regard to the progress of adjacent squads. However, the assault may be prearranged, and take place on order of the platoon leader.

(6) When an objective has been captured, the squad leader places the members of his squad in the most favorable position to repel a counterattack. He then completes the reorganization and prepares to continue the attack. The plan for the organization of the objective should be covered in the attack order. (Reorganization is covered in paragraph 22.)

b. The assistant squad leader, second-in-command of the squad, commands the squad during the leader's absence and replaces him should he become a casualty.

(1) When approaching the enemy he is usually posted at the rear of the squad to prevent straggling and to assist in control of the squad.

(2) During the fire fight he usually assumes command of the AR team.

(3) When a position has been captured, he assists the squad leader by placing the AR team in position to repel counterattack and to cover the reorganization and preparation to continue the attack.

19. FUNCTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE RIFLE SQUAD. One rifleman of the squad is equipped with a grenade launcher and is prepared to assist the squad in its advance by use of the grenade launcher and fragmentation grenades or to protect the squad from tank attack by means of antitank grenades. The five men designated as riflemen are trained in combat training of the individual soldier

and patrolling, as in all situations, it may be necessary to send out varying numbers of riflemen to act as security.

a. When approaching the enemy, a security element may precede the squad. The distance the security element will precede the squad will vary with the terrain and the mission. When the enemy is located, or the security element is fired upon, the location of the enemy is indicated to the squad leader. The enemy fire is returned and every attempt is made to determine his strength and disposition. All information of the enemy is immediately relayed to the squad leader.

b. Members of the squad not employed on a security mission move forward in the designated formation until the security element contacts the enemy. At this time, the attack formation indicated by the squad leader is assumed and positions from which effective fire can be directed at the enemy are chosen. In general, better locations for the AR team will be found on a flank where enfilade, flanking, or oblique fire can be placed on the enemy position. However, the AR team may be placed in the center of the formation if this provides the most suitable location. The assistant squad leader may precede the AR team to choose the best position in the area designated by the squad leader, or he may accompany the team as it moves into the position selected by the squad leader.

c. After the fire fight has begun, the members of the squad advance by fire and movement, and by taking advantage of the cover and concealment offered by the terrain. The AR team will normally cover the advance of the riflemen until fire is masked. When their fire is masked, the AR team, covered by the fire of the remainder of the squad, moves forward to a new firing position.

d. When the objective is captured, all individuals immediately occupy positions from which probable enemy counterattacking forces can be effectively engaged. Initial positions to be occupied are specified in the squad leader's attack order so that the squad can immediately prepare to repel a counterattack. Gaps, due to casualties, are adjusted during the reorganization.

20. USE OF SQUAD FORMATIONS. *a. Squad column.*

(1) *When used*—Normally, the best formation for movement in woods, fog, smoke, darkness, and through narrow defiles or along trails. Good formation for a support squad.

(2) *Advantages*—Provides some degree of all-around protection and facilitates immediate action toward the flanks. Easily controlled.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Is particularly vulnerable to hostile fire from the front and requires a change of formation to permit the employment of all squad weapons to the front.

b. Diamond formation. (1) *When used*—Crossing open ground, or under conditions of low visibility. Especially adapted to situations where readiness for action in any direction is required; for example: a squad acting alone, or as part of a maneuver element. Adapted to traversing zones near the enemy but beyond effective rifle range of known hostile positions. Ideal battlefield formation where contact has not been made but is imminent. Excellent patrol formation.

(2) *Advantages*—Provides all-around fire power, flexibility, and good control. Presents a well-dispersed formation and is not as vulnerable to enemy fire as the column formation.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Requires slight change in dispositions to direct full fire power of the squad to the front.

c. As Skirmishers. (1) *When used*—Initial fighting formation. After contact has been gained, but the squad leader has not completed his reconnaissance to determine the most favorable location for the AR team.

(2) *Advantages*—Provides flexibility and enables squad leader to place AR team carefully. Least vulnerable of all formations to fire from the front. Provides ease of control. Capable of all-around protection.

(3) *Disadvantages*—All weapons of the squad cannot fire to the front. Highly vulnerable to fire from the flank.

d. As Skirmishers, AR right (left). (1) *When used*—Used in the assault and as base of fire. AR team may be on the right, left, or in the center of the formation. Adapted to

rapid dashes across open areas, particularly those exposed to artillery fire.

(2) *Advantages*—Squad can deliver maximum fire to the front. Is less vulnerable to fire from the front.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Formation is difficult to control. Is not capable of all-around protection. Is vulnerable to fire from the flank.

21. ATTACK. The methods of advancing the squad in the attack have been covered in preceding paragraphs. When attacking, the squad leader moves the squad toward the enemy by combining fire and movement, or by stealth, if a covered route is available. He may employ a portion of the squad to cover the enemy position with fire, while he moves the remainder of the squad for a short distance via a covered route to a flank of the enemy position. The most favorable condition under which the squad leader can launch the attack is when the enemy dispositions have been located and the squad is in favorable position to engage them by fire at close range.

22. REORGANIZATION. *a. Organization to repel a counterattack.* The mission of the squad during reorganization is to repel counterattack and to prepare to continue the attack. In his attack order, the squad leader assigns positions on the objective which are to be occupied by members of the squad. When the objective is captured, all individuals immediately take positions, as designated by the squad leader in his order, disposed to provide all-around defense of the area. If the squad is acting as part of a rifle platoon, the squad will defend the sector designated by the platoon leader.

b. Preparation to continue the attack. After these positions have been occupied and the squad is prepared to repel the probable enemy counterattack, the squad leader then makes such changes in the defense plan as are necessitated by casualties to personnel or loss of weapons. The squad leader next completes the reorganization of his squad by replacing key individuals and redistributing weapons and ammunition, and then prepares to continue the attack.

23. WITHDRAWAL. Fire and movement in the squad are used to the same extent during the withdrawal as during the conduct of the attack. The guiding principle in withdrawal technique is first to disengage the least involved individuals or groups, moving them to the rear where they can fire on the enemy positions and thus cover the withdrawal of the elements left in position. Rearward displacement is accomplished by fire and movement until the action has been broken off.

24. CONDUCT OF COMBAT EXERCISES. *a. General.* Combat exercises are conducted on varied terrain to give the squad leader practical work in:

(1) Moving the squad over varied terrain requiring him to change formation to conform to the terrain and mission.

(2) Controlling the formations while attacking an enemy position.

(3) Utilizing the principles of fire and movement.

b. Squad in the approach march. Exercises should be drawn up to include:

(1) A squad acting as the leading element of a platoon in approach march formation.

(2) A squad acting alone as a patrol.

(3) The use of as much varied terrain as possible; i.e., woods, open fields, draws, etc. Thus the squad leader will be required to:

(a) Evaluate terrain.

(b) Change the formation to fit the terrain.

c. Squad in the attack. The exercises should be written so that the leading elements of the squad either locate the enemy position or are fired upon. The exercises should require the squad leader to:

(1) Have his squad take cover.

(2) Contact his security element to determine the enemy's dispositions, strength, and locations and, based on this information, to formulate his plan of attack.

(3) Decide on the best location for the riflemen and the AR team and move them into position.

(4) Launch the attack by advancing the squad with a combination of fire and movement. In his attack order the squad leader may direct a portion of the squad to maintain fire on the enemy position and, taking advantage of the terrain (a covered draw, or clump of woods), move the balance of the squad to a position from which the flank of the enemy may be attacked.

(5) Assault and capture the enemy position.

(6) Prepare to repel a counterattack.

(7) Reorganize and prepare to continue the attack.

d. Purpose of combat exercises. (1) These combat exercises, properly conducted, will provide training in:

(a) Use of formations taught in combat drill.

(b) Security measures.

(c) Proper use of terrain.

(d) Methods of advancing in the attack.

(e) Formations for the assault.

(f) Immediate organization of a captured position to repel enemy counterattack.

(g) Preparations to continue the attack.

(2) This training facilitates transition from combat exercises to tactical exercises conducted on a broader scale.

Section 5

COMBAT EXERCISES: RIFLE PLATOON

25. GENERAL. Combat exercises for the rifle platoon are conducted in the field to train the platoon leader and his subordinates to evaluate terrain, select proper formations, exercise maximum control over the platoon, and execute logical maneuvers against an imaginary enemy or a terrain feature.

26. CONDUCT OF TRAINING. Combat exercises are divided into three phases:

a. The approach march phase includes the proper formations to be used in various situations depending upon the terrain, and what is known of the enemy situation.

b. The *attack phase* includes the methods of attack which are available to the platoon, once contact with the enemy has been gained, utilizing the principle of fire and maneuver.

c. The *reorganization phase* includes the actions of the platoon once an objective has been captured.

27. DUTIES OF PLATOON LEADER, PLATOON SERGEANT, AND PLATOON GUIDE. *a. The platoon leader commands the platoon.* When approaching the enemy, he prescribes the initial formation, controls the advance of the platoon, and changes its formation in accordance with the enemy situation and the terrain, so as to have the greatest amount of protection from enemy observation and fire, and so that he will be in a position to employ favorably the bulk of his force in any desired direction, if contact is made. As soon as the enemy is located, he makes a hasty visual reconnaissance to determine:

(1) The best route of approach to the enemy position.

(2) The best location for his base of fire squad(s) and attached weapons.

(3) The most favorable position from which an attack can be launched.

He then commands or signals his squads into their proper positions, and he goes with that portion of his platoon which will exert the greatest influence on the action, usually the maneuvering element. When the objective is captured, he organizes the position to repel a counterattack, and makes preparations to continue the attack.

b. The platoon sergeant is second-in-command of the platoon. When approaching the enemy, he assists the platoon leader in maintaining control of the platoon. When the attack is launched, he usually takes command of that portion of the platoon not personally led by the platoon leader, usually the base of fire element.

c. The platoon guide is the second ranking noncommissioned officer in the platoon. He assists the platoon leader in control of the formations and prevents straggling. In the attack, he may command an element of the platoon, or accompany the maneuver element as second-in-command

to the platoon leader or the platoon sergeant, depending upon who is commanding that element.

28. SECURITY. Whenever the front or flanks of the platoon are exposed, the squad nearest the front or flank is responsible for protecting its respective sector by observation. Dangerous localities are investigated by patrols sent out by the platoon leader. The squad leader of the lead squad may send riflemen to investigate danger areas to the front without being ordered to do so, but the platoon leader is usually in a position to control such action.

29. USE OF PLATOON FORMATIONS.

a. Tactical column. (1) *When used*—Used to move the platoon from one area to another when there is a covering force of friendly troops between the platoon and the enemy.

(2) *Advantages*—Provides maximum control and speed when moving a platoon from one location to another in a combat area, but behind our own front lines.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Vulnerable to enemy artillery fire and enemy air attack.

b. Platoon column. (1) *When used*—Normally the best formation for movement in woods, smoke, fog, at night, and through defiles and along trails. Used to approach an enemy position which is believed to be directly to the front, but not yet located.

(2) *Advantages*—Easy to control and is flexible. Provides some degree of all-around protection and facilitates immediate action toward the flanks.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Vulnerable to hostile fire from the front and requires a change of formation to permit the employment of all but the leading squad.

c. Platoon line. (1) *When used*—Used when the location and strength of the enemy is known, and all fire power is needed directly to the front. Used when the entire platoon is to be the base of fire for a company, or when the platoon is a maneuver element and is in a position on the enemy's flank.

(2) *Advantages*—All available fire power of the platoon can be directed to the front. Less vulnerable to fire from the front.

(3) *Disadvantages*—No maneuver force is available to the platoon leader. Control of the formation is difficult. It is not capable of all-around protection and is vulnerable to fire from the flanks.

d. Platoon vee. (1) *When used*—Used when the enemy is believed to be directly to the front, and his approximate strength and location are known.

(2) *Advantages*—The bulk of the firepower of the platoon can be directed to the front. Offers some degree of flexibility. Provides all-around protection, is easier to control than platoon line, and is less vulnerable to fire from the front.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Not as flexible as platoon column. Bulk of fire is committed to the front. Difficult to control over long distances.

e. Platoon wedge. (1) *When used*—Used when little is known of the enemy strength and dispositions. Also when the platoon is acting alone, or on a wide envelopment when the enemy may be encountered prior to arrival at the attack position.

(2) *Advantages*—Large degree of flexibility. Capable of all-around protection. Easy to control.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Less fire power is immediately available to the front. Consumes relatively more time to close with the enemy since a maneuver usually will be necessary.

f. Platoon echelon right (left). (1) *When used*—Used to protect an open or exposed flank.

(2) *Advantages*—Less vulnerable to fire from the front or flanks. Permits heavy fire to the front and in the direction of the echelon.

(3) *Disadvantages*—Control is difficult, and formation provides less maneuverability than platoon column, vee, or wedge.

30. APPROACH MARCH. In this phase of combat exercises, the platoon is given several march objectives on varied terrain. Several enemy situations which will cause the selection and employment of all formations, except platoon line, are outlined. This will give the platoon leader and his subordinates training in terrain evaluation, assuming tne proper formations, changing from one formation to another, and control of the platoon in different formations and under varied terrain and tactical conditions.

31. ATTACK. *a. General.* After training in the approach march phase, the platoon is prepared to begin the attack phase. The platoon advances in the attack by fire and maneuver, or by stealth, until a favorable position is reached from which the assault may be launched. It may attack frontally, employing all three rifle squads and the weapons squad in the same direction, or it may form a base of fire with one or two rifle squads and elements of the weapons squad, and envelop a flank of the enemy position with the remainder of the platoon. The method of attack selected will depend upon the cover and concealment afforded by the terrain and the effectiveness of enemy fire. The weapons squad will usually be employed as follows:

(1) The light machine-gun team as a part of the base of fire.

(2) The rocket launcher team as a part of the maneuver element unless there is a mechanized threat in the direction of the base of fire, in which case it will remain with that portion of the platoon.

b. Execution. When the platoon is fired upon by the enemy, or when the enemy is detected in a position where he can be engaged by fire, the lead squad(s) normally becomes the base of fire, occupying the most advantageous positions from which effective fire can be delivered upon the enemy. The platoon leader considers the various plans of attack available to him and decides on the best plan. With appropriate commands and signals, he begins the execution of this plan. He informs the lead squad(s) that it will provide the base of fire from its present position, or moves it to a designated position to support the attack by fire. He then leads

the remainder of the platoon (the maneuvering element) in the envelopment of an enemy flank, or he directs elements of his platoon to successive forward firing positions to cover by fire the advance of other elements of the platoon. The weapons squad is employed as described in paragraph 31 *a*, (1) and (2).

c. Example. (1) *Envelopment.* Assuming that the leading element of the platoon is fired upon while it is advancing in platoon wedge, the leading squad immediately returns the fire. The platoon leader decides that, since the terrain affords a good covered avenue of approach to the objective around the right (left) flank, he will envelop to the right (left) with two squads. He directs the leading (first) squad leader to establish a base of fire at a designated position. He orders the weapons squad leader to place his light machine-gun team in position, as part of the base of fire, and orders the rocket launcher team to accompany the enveloping element. He then indicates the direction of attack to the leaders of the second and third squads, and following the covered route previously selected, leads them into attack position on the right flank. This movement is usually made in platoon column formation to facilitate control. The squads deploy as skirmishers when in position to attack the flank of the enemy. Usually the attack is launched when the enveloping force is in position. It indicates that it is moving in on the enemy by opening fire. As the attack of the maneuvering element progresses, the base of fire shifts its fire to the right or left, so as not to endanger the maneuvering element. The base of fire element advances when its fires are masked by the maneuvering element.

(2) *Frontal attack.* Assume that the platoon, advancing in vee formation, has been fired upon by the enemy. The leading squads immediately return this fire. The platoon leader decides to attack frontally since there are no covered routes of approach around either flank (or maneuver is restricted by the presence of units on the flanks). He orders the weapons squad leader to place the light machine-gun team in position with one of the leading squads and to attach the rocket launcher team to the rear squad. He places his platoon sergeant in charge of the rear squad, and directs

this element to move to an advanced firing position covered by the fire of the remainder of the platoon. He then directs the leading squads and the light machine-gun team to


1
2
3
4
NOTE LMG IS PLACED WHEREVER IT CAN OBTAIN BEST FIELDS OF FIRE TO THE FRONT ROCKET LAUNCHER COVERS MOST FAVORABLE APPROACHES FOR ENEMY ARMOR

FIGURE 9.—Envelop right, platoon.

① Advance in deployed formation.
② Scheme of maneuver.
③ Assault.
④ Reorganization.

fire faster to cover the movement of the rear element. This element moves forward taking advantage of the cover and concealment afforded by the terrain, and the protective fires of the remainder of the platoon commanded by the platoon leader. Having moved forward to a good firing position, it opens fire on the enemy at the maximum rate. This is usually the signal for the platoon leader to move the next squad to an advanced firing position protected by the fires of the remainder of the platoon. A portion of the platoon always fires while the remainder of the platoon advances. This process is repeated until the platoon is ready to begin the assault, or until the objective is captured.

(3) *Assault.* The manner of making the assault, as with the squad, depends upon the volume and effectiveness of enemy small-arms fire. Assault fire, if used, is begun on signal of the platoon leader. (In combat, the assault may be started without signal of the platoon leader, in which case, all men and units in the vicinity cooperate wholeheartedly.) As soon as the objective is assaulted and the fire of the base of fire has been masked, the squad(s) forming the base of fire displaces forward to assist the remainder of the platoon in organizing the position to repel counterattack or in continuing the attack.

32. REORGANIZATION. *a. Organization to repel a counterattack.* Immediately upon capture of the objective, the organization and consolidation of the position begins. The entire platoon will be disposed so as to best defend the ground against an enemy counterattack. The platoon leader, with the help of his subordinates, will determine the number of casualties the platoon has suffered, redistribute ammunition, replace key personnel, and report the status of his platoon to the company commander.

b. Preparation to continue the attack. Before the receipt of orders to continue the attack, the platoon leader will make a hasty reconnaissance to determine possible routes forward and the formation to be used by the platoon if it is ordered to continue the attack. Reorganization of the squads, and redistribution of ammunition is completed, and the platoon makes preparations to continue the attack.

33. WITHDRAWAL. *a. General.* When ordered to execute a withdrawal, the rifle platoon does so by stealth, and unobserved by the enemy, if possible. Sometimes, however, it must withdraw under enemy observation or fire. When this is the case, a portion of the platoon covers the withdrawal of the remainder. When the withdrawing element has established itself in its new position, it in turn covers the withdrawal of the element left in position.

b. One method. (1) The platoon being in any combat formation, the platoon leader signals to the first (second, third) squad, PREPARE TO MOVE. He instructs the platoon sergeant to have the other squads follow in turn.

(2) The platoon leader then signals the first squad, FOLLOW ME, and leads it to the new position. The second and third squads fire on the enemy until the first squad has established a base of fire to cover their withdrawal.

(3) At the proper time (usually when the first squad opens fire from the new position), the platoon sergeant orders the second squad to withdraw under cover of the fire of the first and third squads. The platoon sergeant remains with the third squad. When the second squad has opened fire from the rear position, the platoon sergeant leads the third squad to the rear, care being taken not to mask the fire of squads on the new position. The weapons squad withdraws with the platoon sergeant and the last rifle squad.

NOTE: When fire from the new position is not opened by the first squad, the platoon sergeant is signaled to withdraw the second and third squads. A flare or other suitable signal is used.

34. SUMMARY. Training in combat exercises is designed to provide a smooth transition between combat drill and purely tactical exercises of the rifle platoon. In representing the enemy, the use of troops, silhouette targets, and noise making devices will add realism to exercises. Careful preparation of problems to force the platoon leader and noncommissioned officers to use all of the basic formations properly, and to adapt them to changing conditions of terrain and enemy situations, is vital to successful accomplishment of this important training.

Combat Tactics of the Rifle Squad

Section 1
GENERAL

1. COMPOSITION. The rifle squad consists of a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, an automatic rifleman, an assistant automatic rifleman, and five riflemen. All riflemen in the squad are schooled in combat training of the individual soldier and are taught to act as security elements. In addition, one rifleman is equipped and trained as a rifle grenadier.

2. DUTIES OF LEADERS. *a.* The squad leader is responsible for the discipline, appearance, training, control, and conduct of his squad. Under the platoon leader's direction, he insures that his men are fed, obey all rules of personal hygiene and sanitation, and keep their weapons and equipment clean and serviceable. He checks and reports on the ammunition supply within his squad. He is responsible that his men know how to use and care for their weapons, and fight efficiently as a team.

b. The assistant squad leader performs duties assigned by the squad leader, and is in charge of the squad when the leader is absent. He may command part of the squad, usually the AR team, act as an observer, or supervise ammunition supply.

3. TARGET DESIGNATION. As battlefield targets are usually indistinct, they must be pointed out so that they can be found quickly. Everyone in the squad is trained to designate targets quickly and accurately.

4. FIRE CONTROL. *a.* The squad leader must be able to open and cease fire when he desires, adjust the fire of the

squad upon the target, shift all or part of the squad's fire from one target to another, and regulate the rate of fire.

b. The squad leader announces the range, designates the target, and gives the command for opening fire. In combat, he controls the fire by signals, and by having the individuals pass on oral orders along the front of the squad. On receipt of orders from the platoon leader or on his own initiative, the squad leader shifts the fire of all or part of the squad on new targets.

5. FIRE DISTRIBUTION. *a.* Each man fires his first shot at that portion of the target corresponding generally to his position in the squad. He fires his next shots to right and left of the first shot, covering all of the target that he can hit accurately without shifting position. Fire is not limited to points known to contain an enemy. Instead, it is spaced so that no portion of the target remains un-hit.

b. The automatic rifleman distributes his fire over the entire target, or on any target which will best support the advance of the other squad members. He fires rapid single shots, or bursts of two or three rounds. He does not fire longer bursts unless he can take the target in enfilade or it is at very close range.

6. FIRE DISCIPLINE. Fire discipline is maintained by using weapons properly and executing fire orders exactly. It requires care in sight setting, aim, and trigger squeeze. The men must pay close attention to the squad leader in order to stop or change the rate of fire or shift to a new target on his order or signal. When the squad leader releases fire control to the skirmishers, each man selects his own target, estimates the range, and opens and ceases fire as the situation demands without wasting ammunition.

7. RANGE. Ranges are determined most accurately by sighting shots where the strike of bullets can be observed, or by use of tracer ammunition. Because estimation by eye enables a squad to place surprise fire on the target, all men must be trained to estimate ranges accurately.

8. FIRE COMMANDS. *a.* The amount of detail included in a fire command depends upon the time available, the cover, and the character of the target. If the target is at close range and cannot be mistaken, the squad leader may command only, COMMENCE FIRING. (Detailed fire commands cannot be given when the squad is in an exposed position. Fire control is then released to individual skirmishers.)

b. Whenever possible, preliminary commands are issued while under cover, before the men take their firing positions. When the target is difficult to find, the squad leader has the men creep or crawl close enough to the crest to see the foreground. He completes the fire command when the men signal "Ready."

9. AMMUNITION SUPPLY. In addition to the ammunition carried by each member of the squad, the assistant automatic rifleman carries additional ammunition for the automatic rifle. Before entering combat, grenades and extra ammunition are issued. During combat, the squad leader requests more ammunition from the platoon leader when it is needed and also insures that ammunition is taken from casualties.

Section 2

RIFLE SQUAD IN ATTACK

10. GENERAL. When near the enemy, and in danger of his artillery fire, units spread out to effect maximum dispersion and thus minimize losses. This is called *deployment.* The advance to battle positions is called the movement to contact. The movement to contact phase ends when a unit must engage in a fire fight with the enemy to advance further without excessive casualties.

11. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT. *a. Formations.* When the platoon leaves the company column to begin the movement to contact, the squad marches with the platoon. The initial squad formation is prescribed by the platoon leader,

but thereafter the squad leader changes formation to conform to the situation and terrain. In this phase, the squad may move in squad column, as skirmishers, or in diamond formation.

(1) Squad column is vulnerable to enemy fire from the front as the squad cannot employ all of its weapons to fire to the front. However, the squad is easy to control. Squad column is suitable for moving in woods, smoke, or darkness. Squad column allows prompt action toward the flanks.

(2) Diamond formation is the best all-around formation since the squad is always ready to fight in any directions.

(3) As skirmishers formation is less vulnerable to frontal fire and the squad can fire its weapons to the front. The formation is difficult to control, but is flexible and permits the squad leader to move the automatic rifle team to the most favorable position. As skirmishers, AR right (left), is used when full fire power of the squad to the front is desired.

b. Passing through long-range fire. The squad frequently crosses short stretches of ground that are under long-range machine-gun or artillery fire, by rushes. Groups or individuals speed through the area and do not stop until they are safely out of the fire. The squad leader goes first, reforming his squad as the men come through.

c. Position of leaders. (1) The squad leader marches at the head of his squad, or in advance of it, during the movement to contact. He guides on the base squad or, if he commands the base squad, moves as the platoon leader directs. He studies the ground to the front to choose the best route and maintains direction, or designates a member of the squad to do it. He makes minor detours to take advantage of better routes.

(2) The assistant squad leader usually marches in the rear to prevent straggling, keep the men in formation, and insure an orderly advance. During a tank attack, the rifle grenadier armed with antitank rifle grenades takes position to engage tanks.

d. Security: (1) A squad, when operating alone, secures itself initially by members of the squad observing in all directions. When a dangerous locality is approached, the squad leader may direct one or more riflemen to investigate this area. Having accomplished this mission, the security element rejoins its squad or performs such other missions as the squad leader directs. When danger to the front is continuously imminent, the squad leader may require security elements to precede the squad.

(2) When a squad is acting as the security squad of a platoon, it precedes the platoon, moving forward boldly, seeking to force the enemy to fire and thus reveal his position. The distance which the security squad precedes the platoon will vary with the ground and the location of the enemy. At times it may lead by as much as 300 yards. Members of the security squad take advantage of cover, without delaying their advance, and cross exposed ground at a run.

(3) When the security squad reaches woods, security elements reconnoiter within the edge of the woods while covered by other members of the squad. When the leading individual finds that the edge of the woods is clear, he signals "forward" to his squad leader who relays the signal to the platoon leader. The security squad then enters the woods for a short distance and observes toward the enemy until the platoon arrives. Security elements passing through woods keep within sight of each other.

(4) When advancing along a road or path through woods, security elements reconnoiter to the flanks before signalling, "forward," to the platoon. When they reach the area where the road leaves the woods, they halt at the edge of the woods until the platoon leader arrives.

(5) When sent ahead to reconnoiter dangerous points, they signal back whether the platoon should halt, continue to march, or quickly rush across the area. One of the members of the security squad watches for signals from the rear.

(6) When the security elements locate the enemy, they stop, seek cover, and signal this information to the platoon leader. If fired upon, they return the enemy fire and with the aid of tracers, indicate the target and determine the range.

(7) When the security element is halted by fire, the squad leader immediately gets the squad under cover. He studies the ground for covered routes forward, and watches the platoon leader for orders. He may be directed to advance his squad to the vicinity of the forward element and open the fire fight, or to move the squad to another firing position. In advancing the squad he avoids, as much as possible, the fire holding up the forward element. He sends the squad forward by rushes, by creeping and crawling, or by sending men across singly or in small groups. (The squad moves by rushes when enemy fire permits and the distance to be covered is short. When there is cover and concealment, the men creep and crawl to their firing positions. When there is little cover and concealment, and the area is under enemy observation or fire, the squad leader sends men forward singly or in groups of two or three.) Each man or group advances by short rushes to the firing position and opens fire. The others cross under cover of this fire until all men are in a firing position.

12. PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK. *a. Assembly area.* Unless the squad is part of a leading platoon that meets the enemy, it is usually halted briefly in a covered assembly area picked by the platoon leader. Here the men are placed under cover and concealment, digging foxholes if necessary. The squad leader inspects the physical condition and equipment of each man. Extra ammunition is issued.

b. Reconnaissance. The platoon leader should call the squad leader forward to receive the attack order in sufficient time to allow him to reconnoiter or observe the ground over which his squad will attack. If circumstances prohibit this prior reconnaissance and the squad leader must lead his squad into attacking position at once, he selects a tentative route of advance while returning to the squad. He then leads the squad forward to the starting point of the attack, reconnoitering as he moves forward to avoid exposing the squad to small-arms fire.

c. Squad attack order. While in a covered position, the squad leader issues his attack order to all men of his squad.

Every man must know the mission and the plan for accomplishing it. To insure that nothing is left out, the squad leader issues his order in this sequence:

(1) He tells the men all he knows about the enemy and about his own troops that they do not already know and which directly affects their conduct in the action.

(2) He tells them what the squad is to do, and his plan for doing it.

(3) He tells each man what to do, unless they are all to do the same thing.

(4) He tells the squad where he is going to be, pointing out his position on the ground, if possible.

13. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK. *a. Movement to starting point of the attack.* The squad usually moves from the assembly area to the starting point of the attack under control of the platoon leader. The platoon order will direct either that the squad start its attack on signal or at a certain time. The squad must be in place, ready to move forward or commence firing, at the required time. Sometimes the squad is directed to cross a road or other "line of departure" on signal or at a given time. It is then held under cover a short distance behind the line until just before the time of attack. If possible, it leaves the covered area so that, without halting, the leading man crosses the line at the specified moment. In case the squad leader has not been able to reconnoiter or observe the ground over which his squad is to attack, he must compensate for this deficiency by aggressive action, taking advantage of the terrain as he finds it, making quick decisions, placing his AR team in a favorable position, and moving members of his squad so that the enemy in his area will be kept off balance.

b. Fire and movement. (1) Unless the platoon leader orders otherwise, the squad holds its fire until no further advance can be made without firing. At the first firing position, the squad seeks to gain fire superiority by subjecting the enemy to fire of such accuracy and intensity that his fire becomes ineffective. Once gained, it must be maintained. Part of the squad stays in position, firing at an increased rate, while the others move forward under cover

to firing positions nearer the enemy. They then cover the advance of the rearward members. By this combination of fire and movement, the squad moves close enough to take the enemy position by assault. The squad can advance as a unit only when completely protected from enemy small-arms fire, or when enemy fire is kept ineffective by the fire of other units or of supporting weapons. Therefore, the squad usually works forward by advancing individuals.

(2) When the squad leader moves forward with one element, he turns over command of the remaining men to the assistant squad leader.

(3) In moving forward from one position to another, the men are halted under cover in rear of the new position. The squad leader creeps forward quickly to observe the target and to decide where to place his men. He first selects a position for the automatic rifle team, usually the one with the best field of fire, then, positions for the riflemen. He has the men move forward to observe the target without exposing themselves, then gives them the sight setting and a description of the target. At the command, FIRE POSITION, the men crawl to their places, opening fire when the leader orders or signals, COMMENCE FIRING.

c. The squad leader. (1) During the fire fight, the primary duty of the squad leader is to place the fire of his squad on the target. He takes a position where he can control his men, observe their fire, and maintain contact with the platoon leader. At times he may have to go to the firing line and move from man to man in order to give instructions. He fires only in an emergency, or whenever he believes that his firing is more necessary than keeping close control of his squad. Fire control over part of the squad, usually the AR Team, may be assigned to the assistant squad leader, who may also be detailed to watch the platoon leader for signals. Experienced soldiers may be designated to enforce fire discipline over two or three men in their immediate vicinity.

(2) The squad leader is constantly alert for an opportunity to move his squad nearer the enemy. He prevents the men from bunching or becoming so separated that he loses

control. He observes the location of units on his flanks, and promptly notifies the platoon leader whenever wide gaps appear. During lulls in the fight, he checks ammunition and has ammunition collected from the dead and wounded. If the squad becomes separated from the platoon, he joins the nearest friendly troops and takes his orders from their commander.

d. Assistant squad leader. Although the assistant squad leader usually controls the AR team, his position is not fixed. He goes wherever he can best assist the squad leader. He assists in enforcing fire discipline, controlling fire, replenishing ammunition, and maintaining contact with the platoon leader.

14. THE ASSAULT. The assault is delivered on order, at the platoon leader's signal, or on the initiative of the squad leader. It is delivered at the earliest moment that promises success, regardless of the progress of adjacent squads. Keeping close to supporting fires, the squad approaches as near as possible to the enemy position. When the fires lift, the squad advances on the position, using assault fire if necessary to pin the enemy down. In the final stage, the position is overrun in a single rush with the bayonet. A hand grenade volley may precede the final charge against an entrenched enemy. The enemy is pursued by fire only, unless the platoon leader orders otherwise.

15. REORGANIZATION. *a. To repel counterattack.* After taking the enemy position, the squad leader immediately disposes his squad to provide all-around defense of the area and to repel a counterattack.

b. Preparation to continue the attack. This phase of reorganization consists of replacing casualties and redistributing ammunition and weapons preparatory to continuing the advance.

16. SUPPORT SQUAD. *a.* Before the attack, the leader of a support squad informs his men of the situation and the proposed action of the platoon. He advances on order or signal from the platoon leader, keeping under cover and preventing his squad from merging with the attacking squads.

b. When directed to reinforce the attacking squad or squads, he points out to his men, from cover, the position of the enemy and of the attacking elements. He indicates the part of the line to be reinforced, and prepares the squad for a rush.

c. If ordered to envelop a definitely located enemy position from a flank, he reconnoiters for a departure position for the attack and for a covered route of approach to it. He then moves the squad, protected by security elements if necessary, to the position. The squad opens surprise fire, then assaults the enemy.

Section 3

RIFLE SQUAD IN DEFENSE

17. GENERAL. The platoon leader's order assigns an area for the squad to defend and a sector of fire to cover. The location and principal directions of fire for the automatic rifleman and the rifle grenadier are also given. The squad leader selects the position and sector of fire for each man. As soon as the squad reaches its area, the automatic rifle team moves into a firing position to protect the squad.

18. SQUAD DEFENSE ORDER. Upon receiving the platoon order, the squad leader looks over the area he will defend. He notes where the other squads will be and any supporting weapons for which he must provide close protection. He then issues his defense order to include:

a. The enemy situation.

b. The location of adjacent squads and supporting weapons.

c. The squad area and sector of fire.

d. The location of each member of the squad.

e. The location of the platoon and company command post.

19. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE AREA. *a.* The squad leader has each man lie down in a firing position. In this manner the squad leader checks the field of fire in

front of each member of his squad. After his men have been placed on the position, the squad leader shifts their positions, if necessary, until they can cover the squad sector of fire. Fields of fire are then cleared in the near foreground and foxholes are dug. In dense or heavily wooded terrain, if individual foxholes are to be dug, there should be approximately five yards between men. In more open terrain, individual foxholes may be five to ten yards apart. If two-man foxholes are to be employed, the distance between foxholes may be increased, depending upon the nature of the terrain to be defended. Ranges are estimated to the most important landmarks in the squad sector.

b. The sector of fire assigned to each man overlaps the one next to it. Weapons located on the flanks are given sectors of fire that overlap those of adjacent squads.

c. After the men have dug in, the squad leader examines his position from the direction of the enemy, making certain that all men are fully concealed.

d. The squad leader places himself wherever he can best control the squad and observe the area. The assistant squad leader and the rifle grenadier cover favorable approaches for enemy tanks. The assistant squad leader must also be stationed where he can help the leader control the squad.

e. The squad leader then prepares, in duplicate, a rough sketch of the squad sector of fire, the prominent terrain features, and estimated ranges to them. He sends this sketch to the platoon leader, keeping the duplicate copy for his own use.

20. CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE. *a.* The enemy normally precedes his advance on the position with an air-artillery bombardment. During this phase, the squad keeps under cover in foxholes. When the bombardment in the immediate area ends, firing positions are taken and the squad is alerted for the infantry attack which generally follows. Fire is withheld until the enemy get within effective rifle range (500 yards). The squad opens fire only when the squad leader gives the command.

b. The success of the entire defense depends upon each squad holding its position. If enemy riflemen get into the squad area, they are driven out by fire, grenades, and the bayonet. A stubborn defense by the front-line squads will break up the enemy attack, and make him vulnerable to counterattacks by higher units. *The squad withdraws only on orders from a higher commander.*

21. WITHDRAWALS. *a.* In a night withdrawal, the squad leader moves his men directly to the rear at the specified time, assembling them in the first position that affords cover. They then form squad column and are conducted to the platoon assembly area.

b. In a daylight withdrawal, men are sent back singly along covered routes to the platoon assembly area. There the assistant squad leader re-forms the squad. The squad leader withdraws with the last group which is usually the automatic rifle team.

Section 4

THE RIFLE SQUAD ON SECURITY MISSIONS

22. GENERAL. *a.* A unit must provide for all-around security at all times. A marching column sends a detachment to the front (the advance guard) and another to follow in rear (the rear guard). The advance guard is divided into groups known from rear to front, as the reserve, support, advance party, and point. A rear guard consists of the reserve, support, rear party, and rear point. A squad may act as the point for either type of guard.

b. A unit at rest in camp or bivouac establishes an outpost consisting of a reserve which sends out supports; these, in turn, establish outguards, usually consisting of a squad or part of a squad.

c. Other squad security missions include acting as a flank guard, march outpost, or connecting groups. Usually only a complete squad is detailed for one of these security missions.

23. POINT OF AN ADVANCE GUARD. *a.* The point usually consists of a rifle squad sent forward by the advance party. It marches ahead of the column, and gives warning of any enemy that might have eluded the motorized patrols. The point also protects the column against surprise attacks from the enemy troops near the route of advance.



FIGURE 1.—Disposition of rifle squad employed as point of the advance guard.

b. Usually the point does not march more than 300 yards in front of the advance party. It moves in a column of twos, with one file on each side of the road, and the men at least five paces apart. In this formation, the point can be easily controlled by the leader, and the man can fire

readily toward the front or either flank. The leader is usually near the head, although he may go wherever he is needed. The assistant squad leader is normally the last man in the point.

c. The point fires on all enemy within effective rifle range. If an enemy is seen beyond range, the signal, "enemy in sight," is sent back, and the point continues to advance. When the enemy is within range, the point opens fire and tries to drive him off. When forced to stop, or if unable to drive off the enemy, the point holds its position, covering the movement of the advance party.

d. The point observes toward the front and flanks but does not leave the route to search any areas on the flanks. It halts only on orders of the advance party commander. When the column halts, the point sends forward one or more observers to guard against a surprise attack.

24. POINT OF A FLANK GUARD. The point of a flank guard operates as the platoon leader directs, in the same manner as the point of an advance guard.

25. POINT OF A REAR GUARD. The rear point is usually a squad sent back from the rear party. The rear point stops to fire only when the enemy threatens to interfere with the march. When the enemy is seen, "enemy in sight," is signaled back to the rear party commander, but the point can expect no reinforcements. When the enemy presses closely, the rear point fights in place, giving the troops in back of it time to get into position. When forced back, it withdraws around a flank or along a specified route, so as not to mask the fire of the rear party.

26. CONNECTING FILES. Connecting files consist of men sent out by one unit to keep contact with another. They pass along all orders, signals, and messages from the unit that sends them out, but pass back no signals except, "enemy in sight," and any special signals agreed upon beforehand. If a connecting file consists of one man, he looks alternately to the rear and to the front for signals. When there are two men (double connecting file), one

watches the unit in rear while the other watches to the front. They keep within speaking distance of each other.

27. FLANK PATROL. *a.* A squad may be sent out to guard the flank of a unit, either by going to a certain place or by marching abreast of moving troops.

b. When the flank patrol stays in one place, the leader has each man prepare one or more firing positions for all-around defense. The leader posts one or two men to observe. Another man watches for signals from the unit whose flank is being protected. The rest of the patrol stays under cover, ready to occupy firing positions immediately.

c. If no specific place is given, the leader chooses a posi tion from which the patrol can protect the flank of the unit by holding off the enemy or warning of his approach.

d. If he gets no instructions, the leader moves his patrol so as to guard the flank of the unit along routes that allow him to keep in contact with it. One or two men are detailed to watch the unit constantly for signals. The leader keeps his commander informed of his movements and plans by messages or signals.

e. A flank patrol protecting a marching unit may be ordered to go to a designated place, remain there for a specified time, then rejoin the column. In other situations, the patrol may march along a designated route, or at a specified distance from the flank. As flank patrols often must travel faster or farther then the main body, they should be given motor vehicles, if possible.

(1) The patrol moves so as to prevent the enemy from placing small-arms fire on the column from mid-range (400-600 yards). It searches all areas within this distance that might conceal an enemy. The patrol observes from commanding ground, moving rapidly from point to point, and keeping between the unit and any places that might harbor an enemy. Any enemy sighted is reported to the main body by signal, radio, or messenger. Large enemy forces advancing toward the main body are reported both by signal and messenger, or by radio. Contact with the patrol is maintained by the unit sending it out.

(2) Enemy patrols moving away from the main body are reported but not fired upon. All other enemy forces within range are fired upon at once. If the enemy opens fire on the patrol or column, the patrol determines the enemy strength and disposition, and reports these promptly. Meanwhile, it resists to the last man, any attack on the column, unless ordered to withdraw.

28. CONNECTING GROUP. A rifle squad or smaller group sent out to keep contact with a unit on the flank is called a connecting group. Its mission is to keep the two units informed as to the location and situation of the other. The group also covers any gaps between the two units, warning of, and resisting any enemy penetration. If an adjacent unit falls behind, the fact should be reported at once to the commander who sent out the connecting group. The group may have to divide into two smaller patrols to cover the widened interval and maintain contact with both units. If contact is lost, the group notifies the commander of its parent unit. Unless ordered to return, the group then remains to protect the flank, becoming a flank patrol. The connecting group fires only for self-protection or to warn of an enemy attack.

29. MARCH OUTPOST. When a marching column halts, a march outpost is established on terrain that controls the approaches to the column. When a squad is detailed as a march outpost, it is assigned an area of observation. The squad leader places his men under cover so as to maintain thorough observation of his area. The men are assigned to reliefs, to assure alertness.

30. OUTGUARDS. *a.* A squad, or part of a squad, may act as outguard for a bivouac outpost. The support commander prescribes the posts of the outguard and number of sentinels. Sentinels are designated as, "Sentinel No . . . . . , Outguard No . . . . . , Support No . . . . . " All elements of the outpost are numbered from right to left.

b. The outguard commander selects posts for sentinels covering his sector of observation. During the day, they

are placed primarily to observe; at night, to listen. They occupy different positions at night than in the daytime. All talking at night must be in whispers.

c. Sentinels are given the following information:

(1) As to the enemy: direction; patrol or other activity in the area; special sector to watch.

(2) As to his own troops: location of the supports and outguards to the right and left; number of his relief; any friendly patrols which have gone out and may return through his post; where prisoners are to be taken and messages to be sent.

(3) Special signals, such as the gas alarm and countersign.

(4) Names of features of military importance, such as roads, villages, or streams.

d. Men not posted as sentinels rest nearby under natural cover or in foxholes. They remain fully equipped, with their weapons at hand.

e. The outguard commander is told what to do if the enemy attacks. When his orders direct that he is to fight, he organizes his position for all-around defense.

31. DEFENSE OF OBSTACLES. A reinforced rifle squad may be detailed to cover an obstacle and its flanks with fire. It occupies a concealed position far enough from the obstacle to be out of the bursting zone of artillery fire or dive bombing (200 to 400 yards). At night it moves in closer, but stays beyond hand grenade throwing range. When the squad is protecting a mine field or a mined road block, guards are posted to prevent casualties to friendly troops or vehicles.

Psychological Warfare

"Applied psychology as a weapon of war means propaganda intended to influence the moral attitude of nations toward war. It is essential to attack the enemy nation in its weak spots.....to undermine and break down its resistance and to convince it that it has been deceived, misled, and brought to destruction by its own government. Thus the people will lose confidence in the justice of their cause so that the political opposition....will raise its head and become a more powerful troublemaker. The enemy nation's originally solid, powerful, and well-knit fabric must be gradually disintegrated, broken down, rotted, so that it falls apart like fungus trod upon in the forest..."—Ewald Banes, foremost Nazi theorist on psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare operations of the past war were surrounded with misunderstanding and misconception to a greater extent than any other single activity. For example: It was whispered among the German soldiers that the allies were using a secret bomb that sucked all of the oxygen out of the air; eventually the whisper gave birth to the rumor that whole populations of cities within the Reich were being smothered. It was whispered that the bubonic plague in Rotterdam was the result of a new long range rocket shell loaded with deadly germs; it was widely rumored that the German Surgeon General had ordered that henceforth all critically wounded would be abandoned on the battlefield where they fell. In some instances such rumors were closely coupled with violent action: A German soldier's body was found with his wrists and throat slashed giving the appearance of suicide. On his body was found a cleverly counterfeited newspaper clipping stating that Himmler had just announced that any German wife who had not given birth

to a baby during the past two years must report to an SS breeding farm.

These actual happenings are merely isolated incidents resulting from our psychological warfare activities during the past conflict. They are printed here to illustrate that there is no justification for the popular belief that the propaganda of a decent, democratic nation is and should be, "the truth and *nothing but the truth.*"

This is only one of many popular misconceptions concerning psychological warfare. These misconceptions are understandable when it is realized that our psychological warfare machinery was conceived and organized after the outbreak of hostilities, during which period it was necessarily shrouded in secrecy.

In order to clarify these misconceptions it is first necessary to understand the relationship of psychological warfare to modern warfare in general. Modern warfare consists of three basic elements:

Military Warfare—that military action of land, sea and air forces aimed at the destruction of enemy resources—cities, supplies, and manpower.

Economic Warfare—the struggle for food, raw material, manufacturing capacity, and transportation facilities.

Psychological Warfare—the struggle for control over the *emotions* and minds of men, which determine the loyalties of large masses of people, their willingness or unwillingness to fight, as well as the strength and resourcefulness with which they are able to ward off attack or defeat an enemy.

Psychological warfare has been further described as *any* measure, means, or action which can be used to bring about the willingness of the enemy to surrender. Since willingness to surrender is a state of mind, then all the various means used to bring about a change of mind from the determination to resist to the willingness to accept defeat, can be called psychological warfare measures. However, the chief tool of psychological warfare—the one that is most peculiarly psychological—is propaganda.

The strategy and tactics of changing opinion in a nation, in a group within a nation, or even in specific enemy troops,

must include propaganda. In total war, economic, military, and psychological action are all used to bring about submission of the enemy. Economic action deprives the enemy of vital materials. Military action destroys his armies by killing, capturing or scattering the soldiers, smashing or capturing the guns, tanks, planes, trucks, and supplies. But it is successful psychological action, or propaganda, that in the end *deprives the enemy of his will to resist*, and causes him to submit his will to the will of the conqueror.

Although death may be inflicted upon the bodies of the enemy and destruction wrought upon his property, *defeat is a conquest of the mind.*

PROPAGANDA APPROACHES

Of what does psychological warfare consist? A careful analysis shows that it consists of two basic elements—the threat, or appeal to fear—and the bribe, or appeal to cupidity or greed.

The threat, may be real as it was when Germany threatened to invade Poland; or it may be a bluff, as it was when Hitler marched into the Rhineland, lacking the military power to make good the threat had the bluff been called. The bribe, too, may be real or pretended. Hungary, for example, was awarded a portion of Transylvania as a reward for joining the Axis. The Italians, however, did not get Corsica.

Psychological warfare against a declared or undeclared enemy is probably as old as human history. For example, when the earliest savage raised his fist against his neighbor, he was using the psychological weapon of the threat. When he baited a trap, he was exploiting the appeal to greed. Bluff, bribery, and deception have played a part in every human struggle throughout history, but it remained for our

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[1]It is significant that the Germans, whose favorite weapon was coercion by fear, called their psychological warfare "Nervenkrieg" or war of nerves; while the British, who rarely threaten and prefer to rely upon the persuasion of the promised reward, refer to their psychological warfare operations as "political warfare."

generation to develop psychological warfare as a means of systematic nationalistic aggression.

FUNCTIONS OF PROPAGANDA

Psychological warfare aims at the undermining of the peoples' confidence in its cause, its strength, its leaders, and itself; and at the destruction of its determination to fight for its cause, or even its existence.

This combination, confidence and determination, we call morale. When a nation's morale is destroyed, it commits suicide—as did Austria—or else it submits to conquest after feeble and disorganized resistance—as did France. In any case, it reaches a state of mind in which resistance seems hopeless and surrender less evil than the endurance of armed conflict.

In time of declared or actual war, the psychological warfare agency, in addition to the destruction of enemy morale, is charged with the following functions: the maintenance of home morale; the maintenance of the confidence of the peoples of friendly or allied nations; and winning the sympathy of the peoples of neutral countries.

All of these assignments are carried out by the implantation of carefully selected ideas and concepts. These ideas and concepts are neither *necessarily true* nor *necessarily false*. The fact that they are true or false makes no difference whatsoever if they create the desired state of mind. There is no validity whatsoever to the widely held belief that dissemination of propaganda consists, by definition, of spreading lies.

This fact introduces another subject frequently misunderstood by the general public; i.e., the difference between *propaganda* and *information*.

The primary cause of this misunderstanding is that we are novices at psychological warfare even though we are experts in the techniques of propaganda. No other nation is as skilled in sales propaganda, or in advertising as we; no other nation has developed domestic good-will propaganda, or public relations, to the extent that we have developed

them; no other nation indulges in orgies of political propaganda to the extent that we do every four years when we elect a President. Yet in spite of our familiarity with some of the techniques of psychological warfare, we are unfamiliar with the use of these techniques as a method of conducting modern warfare. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that we are so familiar with the use of propaganda for peacetime domestic purposes that we are incapable of refraining from applying our peacetime moral standards to propaganda in wartime. In other words, our long association with a propaganda that has been honest and aboveboard has made many of us incapable of conceiving of our government indulging in underhanded methods or deceit. Fortunately, during the last war, we were in a position where most of our propaganda could be based on truth.

This point cannot be stated with too much emphasis: information and propaganda are two different entities.

The purpose of spreading information is to *promote the functioning of man's reason.*

The purpose of propaganda is to *mobilize or arouse certain of man's emotions in such a way that they will dominate his reason,* however, not necessarily with evil design.

The function of an information agency is to disseminate truth—to make available facts and opinions, each carefully labeled and separated from the other, and thus enable as many people as possible to form their own opinions and individual judgements on the basis of relevant fact and authoritative opinion.

The function of a propaganda agency is almost the exact opposite; not to inform, but to persuade. In order to persuade, it must disseminate only such fact and opinion, and such fiction masqueraded as fact, as will serve to make the people act, or fail to act, in the desired way.

Everyone can undoubtedly recall having read in the newspapers or heard over the radio, statements from some of our propaganda officials to the effect that, "American propaganda is the propaganda of truth." The inference has been that we Americans tell the truth as a matter of principle and that the enemy lies habitually. Carrying this premise

to its extreme, we imply that we would not lie, even if we could save American lives by doing so.

It so happens that in this particular war our best weapon has been the truth—at least most of the time. We were fighting an enemy whose aggressive propaganda was based upon lies and distortion. Fact was usually on our side and could frequently be utilized with only a minimum of distortion. It paid us, therefore, to use fact rather than resort to fiction.

It should be emphasized that this is quite a different thing from saying that we used fact because, as a matter of principle, we would not stoop to fiction. We actually used fiction very successfully on a number of occasions. For example, when our troops landed in North Africa, the Germans expected an invasion of Norway or the Channel Coast because we used every possible device to make them believe that we were headed in one of those directions. On this and other occasions our fiction saved countless British and American lives. On the basis of truth or falsehood, there is no difference between our saying, "Hitler is dead" (which we did on one occasion in order to force Hitler to speak after a long period of silence), and the Germans saying, "Roosevelt is a Jew" (which they did on all occasions).

James P. Warbourg who was head of our psychological warfare operations in Europe for a period during the war, offers in his book *Unwritten Treaty*, what he thinks is an explanation for the fact that many Americans fail to realize that we have resorted to lies in our propaganda. He says"....this is something which no American propaganda official would think of explaining to Congress or to the American people. This is something which is considered not quite 'nice'. This is because the top officials in our propaganda machine have been men trained in the field of information, who like to think that propaganda warfare is the same thing as running an honest international news service. Most members of Congress are happier thinking that this is true, and are more easily persuaded to appropriate funds for an agency which, they think, disseminated only the truth."

TYPES OF PROPAGANDA

Dependent upon its source, we classify propaganda as *white, grey,* or *black.*

White propaganda is that which obviously originates from an enemy source, such as leaflets, enemy radio broadcasts, and loud speaker appeals.

Grey propaganda is indeterminate as to source and avoids identification altogether. Rumors are the most common type of grey propaganda.

Black propaganda is that which ostensibly has a source other than its real one. An example of this was the "Lord Haw Haw", broadcasts from Germany in the early days of the war. These programs posed as actually being of British origin.

The latter type is the most difficult to produce and present. Black propaganda asserts that it is being broadcast by a secret radio station within the enemy country. For instance, such a station could be a station in Germany operating in opposition to the German Nazi government, whereas in reality, it might be an American station broadcasting to Germany. Such was actually the case during the last war. The most effective technique of black propaganda is to spread rumors by denying them or to put ideas into the listeners' minds by arguing against them. For instance, a radio station once denied that scrap dealers in Germany were holding onto their scrap iron in anticipation of a rise in price. The broadcast then went on to describe some of the methods and ruses the dealers had ostensibly used to hang on to their scrap iron. The broadcast was very effective in bringing about just such action on the part of scrap dealers.

On another occasion, an appeal was broadcast to the German housewives urging them not to rush to the stores in an attempt to use up their ration books, for there was nothing to the rumor that the German government was about to cancel the current books because allied aircraft had been dropping cleverly counterfeited copies of their present issue of ration books over certain sections of Germany. Again the desired effect was gained.

REQUISITES OF PROPAGANDA

Just what are the requisites of good propaganda? It goes without saying that the best propaganda is propaganda *based* on the truth. Yet even the truth must be interpreted in such a way as to influence a state of mind if it is to be effective propaganda.

In psychological warfare the goal is to undermine enemy morale; to persuade the enemy that his cause is hopeless and that it will be better if he gives up. As it has been pointed out, propaganda may be directed at the whole enemy people or merely at the other side of the front lines. It may consist of leaflets dropped on an enemy division telling the enemy that he is surrounded, showing him the evidence that he is really surrounded, and at the same time reminding him of the kindly treatment he will receive as a prisoner of war. Such an example uses both the threat of fear and the promise of reward.

To be effective, propaganda must work on those feelings or emotions already present in the enemy. For instance, it is of no use to argue to a victorious column while it presses into new territory, that final defeat is certain and that surrender would be better. But when the enemy morale is already low, effective propaganda can make it still lower.

Good propaganda usually originates with a fact or an event. An actual enemy defeat is cited and then its significance is interpreted to the enemy. An air raid that has been unusually successful or an unusual cold spell resulting in deep snow at the front, may serve as subjects for a propaganda attack since the enemy is aware of the fact and is thus liable to give credence to the entire story. If the psychological attack is against a whole country, then the basis of the attack must be some important event that is believed by everyone to be true as well as important. To use an unknown event or an absurd falsehood as a basis for the attack would produce only weak and ineffective propaganda which would probably do harm through loss of prestige. Such feeble efforts would appear absurd to the enemy and only serve as material to aid enemy leaders in ridiculing the opponent.

Starting propaganda off with an important fact gets attention for it immediately and also gives it the flavor of truth. *Even falsehood may be made to seem true when closely associated or connected with the truth.* Since propaganda takes this advantage from facts and truth, it must be timely. There is no use in telling the enemy what good food you have until you know that he is short of food. Then, it is a grave error to miss an opportunity of reminding him of what he could have to eat as a prisoner of war.

It is also well to remember that the first interpretation is nearly always the longest lived—this is especially true of large scale radio propaganda. If we are able to get our version of an important battle or incident on the air first, the enemy's version may never catch up with it and will probably not be believed when it does come along.

Another point to remember is that propaganda must always be directed toward its audience. It must be addressed to a particular type of mind or a definite set of opinions so that it will seem important to the listeners; important enough for them to risk their lives to listen and *important enough for them to repeat to their friends and neighbors.* One of propaganda's best mediums of dissemination is by word of mouth.

Propaganda must be tied in and operate closely with intelligence agencies. In order to start good propaganda, it is necessary to know how the enemy is feeling and what he is thinking. At the front this can generally be accomplished by questioning prisoners and examining documents. For propaganda directed at the civilian population of an enemy nation, the information about what is going on inside the nation can be obtained from neutral travellers who have recently come across the borders, from monitoring local enemy radio broadcasts, examining enemy publications, or by the use of espionage agents.

MEDIA OF DISSEMINATION

There are a number of media thru which propaganda can be disseminated. Of these media, radio offers the best means of reaching large groups of people and should therefore be

ATTENTION AMERICAN SOLDIERS!

I CEASE RESISTANCE

THIS LEAFLET GUARANTEES HUMANE TREATMENT TO ANY JAPANESE DESIRING TO CEASE RESISTANCE. TAKE HIM IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR NEAREST COMMISSIONED OFFICER.

By Direction of the Commander in Chief.

(日本・家族保護・為・道保投降)

上の英文の内容は「この人は最早敵でなく國際條約により生命、衣食住は勿論医療等が完全に保証さるべき者なり」と云う意味が書かれて居る
左圖は既に當方に來て居られる諸君の戰友の一部

This propaganda leaflet produced results. A similar one carrying the inscription "I SURRENDER," did not. Intelligence agencies determined that it was inimical to the Japanese code of honor to consider surrender under any circumstances, but that the term "CEASE RESISTANCE" carried a different connotation.

given primary consideration when preparing propaganda for dissemination.

Publications such as newspapers, books, magazines, and other periodicals also reach a large audience, but for obvious reasons, are most suitable for disseminating propaganda to friendly or neutral populations. The information or publication may originate within the home state, or may be influenced or operated by the home state, while actual printing and dissemination may be done within another state or nation.

In general, the same facts apply to motion picture films, and certainly no one will question the fact that motion pictures are a very powerful propaganda weapon. Remembering that maintenance of home morale is also a responsibility of psychological warfare, an example of motion pictures as a propaganda agency is the series of orientation films entitled "Why We Fight." Everyone in the armed forces of the United States has seen at least a few of those films and has undoubtedly been influenced by them.

The discussion and analysis of the agencies previously enumerated well illustrate the need for a medium or agency to do a more specific type of work such as influencing a particular group, a certain unit, or even a sector of the front lines. During the past war several such media have been developed. The propaganda most frequently encountered by combat units were propaganda leaflets and pamphlets which were distributed by air drop, by artillery leaflet shells, or by resistance groups or clandestine operators which reached small groups within the enemy's borders. Air drops varied in size from saturation drops of hundreds of thousands of leaflets over entire cities or areas by the tactical airforce, to small pinpoint drops of a few hundred leaflets accomplished by liaison planes on surrounded or isolated pockets or strong points.

Artillery leaflet shells provided another means of making pinpoint delivery of leaflets. Our propaganda periodicals "Feld Post" and "Front Post", used against the Germans in both Europe and Italy, were distributed in this manner. Both were small pamphlets containing late news of the

front, true happenings and incidents gleaned from intelligence sources which cast unfavorable light on the German leaders, and news of important international events and development, always interpreted and written in such a way as to instill an element of doubt and distrust in the mind

Frontpost

AUSGABE SÜD

Nummer 77 — Nachrichtenblatt für deutsche Soldaten — 31 Oktober 1944

Deutsche 15. Armee auf die Maas zurückgeworfen

«General Montgomery hat die Schlacht von Westholland gewonnen.» Das ist zusammengefasst die allgemeine Ansicht der alliierten Militärsachverständigen über die Lage im nördlichen Abschnitt der Westfront.

Wieder hat eine deutsche Armee, mit einem breiten Strom im Rücken und ohne ausreichende Fliegerdeckung, ihre Stellungen zu lange halten müssen. Im August erlitt die deutsche 7. Armee überaus schwere Verluste bei dem Versuch, die Seine zu überschreiten. Heute fallen Teile der deutschen 15. Armee, etwa 40 000 Mann der Schätzung nach, auf die drei ihnen noch zur Verfügung stehenden Massenübergänge zurück oder versuchen, unter andauernden Fliegerangriffen den Fluss auf Fähren zu überqueren.

Alliierte Verbände, die die deutschen Verteidigungsstellungen durchbrochen haben, haben am 29. Oktober Breda und am 30. Roosendaal und Oosterhout genommen. Nördlich der letztgenannten Stadt haben Verbände der englischen 2. Armee sich der Maas bis auf 2 km genähert und halten die deutschen Truppen bei ihrem Rückzug über den Fluss unter Werferfeuer. Alliierte Bomber und Jäger greifen fortgesetzt die deutschen Kolonnen an.

Weiter westlich haben kanadische Truppen nach der Besetzung von Südbeveland 6 000 deutsche Soldaten von den ursprünglich 11 000 in Südbeveland und auf Walcheren zurückgebliebenen, als Gefangene eingebracht. Aus dem letzten deutschen Kessel südlich der Schelde, der nach seiner Auflösung entgegenging, wurden weitere 7 000 Deutsche gefangen genommen. Nur noch die Geschützstellungen von Vlissingen auf der überfluteten Insel Walcheren sind zum Schweigen zu bringen, um den unbeschädigten Hafen von Antwerpen für die Benutzung durch die Alliierten freizumachen.

Eine deutsche Gegenoffensive gegen den Ostabschnitt des englischen Frontvorsprunges, bei der unter anderm 2 Panzerdivisionen eingesetzt wurden, brachte keine nennenswerten Geländegewinne und konnte zum Stehen gebracht werden. Raketenfeuernde Typhoon-Jäger flogen besonders wirkungsvolle Angriffe gegen deutsche Truppenansammlungen, Flussbrücken und Fähren.

Auf dem Südabschnitt der Westfront haben amerikanische Truppen nach heftigen Kämpfen Metz eingenommen.

Feldmarschall Paulus

„Deutschlands einziger Ausweg - los von Hitler"

«Es gibt jetzt nur noch einen Weg, der das deutsche Volk aus der Aussichtslosigkeit seiner Lage herausführt: Trennung von Hitler.» So äusserte sich Generalfeldmarschall Paulus, Befehlshaber der deutschen 6. Armee bei Stalingrad, am 28. Oktober im Moskauer Rundfunk.

«Es ist eine infame Lüge», sagte Paulus, «zu behaupten, dass deutsche Soldaten in russischer Gefangenschaft unmenschlich behandelt werden. Wahr ist vielmehr, dass sie menschlich und gerecht behandelt werden, trotz der Greueltaten, die die SS im Osten verübt hat.

Im Gefühl der Pflicht, ihrem Volk zu helfen, haben sich Hunderttausende deutscher Kriegsgefangener in Russland, darunter Tausende von Offizieren und über dreissig Generäle, der Bewegung «Freies Deutschland» angeschlossen. Himmler weiss sehr wohl, dass es sich


Haarlem
Amsterdam
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Vlissingen
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Breda
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Venlo
Roermond
Aachen
Düren
Jülich
Krefeld
Mönchengladbach
Neuss
Köln
Bonn
Koblenz
Trier
Metz
Thionville
Luxemburg
Arlon
Bastogne
Verdun
Sedan
Reims
Charleville
Mézières
Rethel
Laon
Soissons
Compiègne
Beauvais
Amiens
Abbeville
Dieppe
Rouen
Le Havre
Caen
Bayeux
Cherbourg
Falaise
Alençon
Argentan
Lisieux
Evreux
Dreux
Chartres
Orléans
Montargis
Fontainebleau
Melun
Meaux
Paris
Versailles
Rambouillet
Mantes
Pontoise
Beauvais
Compiègne
Soissons
Laon
Reims
Epernay
Châlons
Vitry
Bar-le-Duc
Commercy
Toul
Nancy
Epinal
Remiremont
Colmar
Mulhouse
Belfort
Montbéliard
Besançon
Dole
Dijon
Auxerre
Sens
Troyes
Nogent
Provins
Fontainebleau
Melun
Meaux
Paris
Versailles
Rambouillet
Mantes
Evreux
Dreux
Chartres
Orléans
Montargis
Gien

of the German reader. One German POW made the following comment with regard to these pamphlets: "The pamphlets were read by everyone fortunate enough to find them.

(TRANSLATION)

Frontpost

AUSGABE SÜD

No. 77 Newspaper for German troops October 31st, 1944

German 15th Army pushed towards Maas crossings

«Field Marshal Montgomery has won the battle of Western Holland.» This is how Allied experts sum up the situation on the northern sector of the Western Front.

Once again a German army, with a broad river at its back and inadequate air cover, was left to hold its positions for too long. In August, the German 7th Army suffered crippling losses in attempting to retreat across the Seine. Today elements of the German 15th Army estimated at 40,000 men are racing towards three crossings of the river Maas still available to them, or endeavouring to cross the river by ferry under air attack.

Allied forces which broke through the German defences on the 29th Oct. took Breda and on the 30th Roosendaal and Oosterhuit. North of the last-named town, troops of the British 2nd Army have reached points only 2 km from the Maas and are mortaring German troops escaping across the river. Allied bombers and fighters are continuously attacking retreating German columns.

Further West, Canadian and British forces which overran South Beveland have taken prisoner 6000 of the approximately 11,000 German troops left behind in South Beveland and Walcheren. A further 7000 Germans have been captured in the last German pocket south of the Scheldt, which is rapidly being reduced. Only the guns at Flushing, on the submerged island of Walcheren, remain to be reduced before the undamaged port of Antwerp is clear for Allied use.

A counter-offensive launched by German forces including two armoured divisions against the eastern sector of the British salient was brought to a stop without significant gains. RAF rocket firing Typhoon fighters were particularly effective in attacking German troop concentrations, pontoon bridges and barges.

On the southern sector of the Western Front, American troops after severe fighting occupied Maizieres, near Metz.



Field Marshal Paulus:

„Germany's only way out - away from Hitler!"

«In the present hopeless war situation the German people has only one way out — to separate from Hitler», Field Marshal Paulus, former German 6th Army Commander at Stalingrad, said over the Moscow Radio on the 28th Oct.

Paulus also said:

«It is an infamous lie to say that the Russians maltreat German prisoners of war. The truth is that they are treated well and humanely, in spite of the cruelties committed in the East by the SS.

«As a duty to their own people, hundreds of thousands of German prisoners of war in Russia, including thousands of officers and more than 30 generals, have joined the movement «Free Germany». «Himmler knows very well these men are not dishono-

The English translation of this propaganda medium indicates that it is obviously white in nature. The headlines stress facts which the soldiers know to be true and which will eventually be admitted by the official German publications.

The distribution is always awaited eagerly although strict punishment is received by those soldiers caught collecting pamphlets."—Because most of the statements were later confirmed by their own publications, many German soldiers were convinced that our propaganda leaflets contained the truth.

Still another method of distribution of propaganda text is through loud speakers, both on the ground and in the air. The limitations on this medium are obvious; it necessitates an operator wno speaks the enemy language fluently and the loud speakers must be installed within hearing distance of the enemy. Even so, this means has been widely used. The Germans used it very effectively against the French in the Maginot Line; we used it frequently throughout the European campaigns by mounting loud speakers on tanks. It was used even more extensively in the Pacific Theater. Many times captured enemy soldiers were used to address the personnel of their unit, appealing to them to lay down their arms and surrender.

The use of captured enemy soldiers and civilians might be listed as an agency or a medium, but it was not used extensively. However, it was used on occasions in the Pacific area with a degree of success. For instance, a POW on Leyte volunteered to return to the hills and attempt to persuade some of his friends to cease resistance—he brought back nine. There were numerous examples of POW's making appeals thru loud speakers or actually writing material for leaflet drops.

Espionage agents operating behind the enemy lines, observers, or our own fifth columnists, spreading disconcerting rumors among the enemy by word of mouth, serve as an efficient medium of dissemination. Underground organizations which can be guided or directed according to our designs such as the French Maquis in occupied France, are habitually used to spread disconcerting rumors among the enemy.

The distribution of useful commodities in conjunction with the propaganda message and operation of information

centers by trained personnel are other methods of dissemination used successfully during the past war. For instance, small packages containing two cigarettes were dropped over enemy troops. On the package or wrapper was printed some timely and appropriate propaganda theme. In Southwestern China and Burma, our behind-the-line operators carried a supply of needles, thread, buttons, cloth, drugs, medical supplies, watches, pens, pencils, small mirrors or combs. In areas which the Japanese had occupied for a long period of time, these items were invaluable in securing the good will and cooperation of the natives.

Information centers operated by OWI in friendly and neutral countries, played a great part in cultivating and winning the sympathies of other nations.

By utilizing these media most applicable for any given situation, there are practically no limitations on the scope of operations or on the groups that can be reached with propaganda.

PROPAGANDA TACTICS

In summation, there are certain rules and concepts to be followed in the application of any propaganda. These rules or concepts might well be termed, "The Tactics of Propaganda."

Keep the audience in mind. Address a specific audience, a particular group. Adapt your words to the mentality and frame of mind of that group. Base your speech on up-to-the-minute information about current attitudes in that group. Cite names and events that are familiar to the group. Make use of the desires and prejudices already present in that group.

Beguile. Don't antagonize. Treat the enemy for the moment as if he were a friend. Avoid abuse, taunts, and reproaches. Respect the public figures that the enemy admires. Be objective about enemy defeats and describe them without animosity.

Initiate Rumor. Use material that will get itself repeated to others and put it in such form that it will get repeated. Use familiar terms and simple ideas. Tell anecdotes—

the kind that people will repeat. Tell news suppressed by the enemy, because people will always repeat that. Give facts and figures. Spread rumor by acknowledging it as rumor, so as to protect your own good faith, but spread it. It will soon be repeated as fact without being labeled as rumor.

Link words with action. Confuse the enemy by doing contradictory things as well as by saying them. The propagandist himself cannot do this, but his government can order troops to concentrate at borders when no attack is intended, and can threaten simultaneously, a varity of mutually incompatible actions causing confusion in the enemy's mind.

Be timely. Get there first with your interpretation and seize every opportunity to exploit an event immediately.

Attack weak points. Exploit and magnify disagreements and discontents which you know already exist. Play up the enemy's mistakes. Arouse his feeling of guilt.

Be versatile. Use suggestion. Use short catchy statements, "—The Germans will fight to the last Italian." Incite subversive action by describing it without recommending it. The listener may adopt the suggestion and think it is his own idea. Use positive rather than negative statements. Be clever, but not too obvious in your rationalizations. Capitalize on anxiety. Worry the home front about the troops and the troops about the home front. Suggest positive action only after anxiety, doubt, and guilt have become strong. And last of all, choose arguments that counter-propaganda cannot easily turn against you.

FORMULA FOR APPLICATION

Unlike military tactics, a specific procedure or pattern to follow in the application of these propaganda tactics can be prescribed which will make for more successful propaganda. The proper utilization of these principles results in a "Formula for Successful Propaganda."

The enemy people must be war weary—They must be sick and tired of deprivations, destruction, bloodshed, and devastation. For the most part, this state of mind is produced by military and economic warfare, but psychological warfare can help disillusionment along once it has begun.

Change disillusionment to despair—The second step in this process is to change disillusionment to despair; to convince a war weary people that victory is impossible, that it is folly to continue to believe in their leaders, to cooperate with their fellows, or even go on fighting or working as individuals. All three kinds of warfare—military, economic, and psychological—work together in this respect, for the inhabitants of a bombed-out city may reach despair without being prodded to it by argument. Yet, interpretation of events to a people, or to the soldiers of an army, may speed the process, and may undermine morale that would have stood up if it had not been attacked.

Promise something better—The third step is to offer to despair a promise of something better, or a way out. The cornered beast fights to the death unless he sees a way to escape. So propaganda must offer a solution,—a just and honorable peace, reassurance against indiscriminate reprisals upon the enemy people, something constructive that will make underground activities and surrender look better than continuing the fight.

Fix responsibility on enemy government—To the formula for a just and tolerable peace which is promised as a substitute for intolerable despair, there must be added the thought that, "It is the enemy's own government which is responsible for continuing the war and the suffering." The enemy leaders themselves are unlikely to see any advantage in surrender. Their people must force them to surrender if there is to be a change. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. A General may surrender an army which is hopelessly trapped in order to save the lives of his men.

DEFENSE AGAINST PROPAGANDA

The best and most effective defense against propaganda is knowledge. Our soldiers must be thoroughly familiar with propaganda, its aims, its purpose, its objectives, propaganda methods, and how it operates. If we educate our troops in this manner they will be able to look at propaganda objectively and will not be unduly influenced by it. We must also keep our own troops well informed in general;

give them reliable news; and let them know the bad along with the good. If a soldier *knows* that he can rely and depend on the information given to him by his own government, there will be little likelihood of his being taken in by the enemy's propaganda.

In the past, the enemy's attempts to propagandize American troops usually have been entirely unsuccessful, largely because of their failure to understand the American mind. However, there is no assurance that this will be the case in the future. In the Pacific, every soldier that had an opportunity listened to "Tokio Rose" because her programs were filled with good recorded music. In the European Theater, they collected German propaganda leaflets because of their pornographic nature. In neither case, however, were they greatly influenced by the enemy's propaganda that accompanied these media.

Another rule to remember in combating enemy propaganda is to never forbid troops from reading or listening to enemy propaganda. Such action will only make the troops feel that they *must* see or hear that which is forbidden. Always acknowledge the enemy's propaganda efforts and discuss them openly with the troops and at the same time point out the enemy's erroneous interpretation of the material concerned, making light of it whenever possible.

If propaganda will cause the enemy to quit one minute sooner, if it will cause him to fire one less burst or squeeze off one less round, then it is worthwhile. Propaganda is just another supporting arm working to get the infantryman onto his objective a little sooner with a few less casualties.

Employment of the 57-mm Recoilless Rifle Section in the Attack

PART I

During the fighting in the mountains of Italy during the past war, an infantry regiment of a famous division was stopped by a prepared German defense line. The line consisted of strategically located pillboxes blasted from solid rock and reinforced with concrete. Artillery and mortar fire delivered in enormous quantities failed to reduce the positions. The regimental commander ordered a 57-mm antitank gun dismantled and brought to the top of the mountain along which our lines were located. This feat was accomplished at a great cost in time and labor and the gun was emplaced during the night. At first light, the gun opened fire on a located enemy pillbox and expended four rounds, two of them scoring direct hits. An enemy artillery and rocket concentration was immediately delivered on the gun position and the weapon was completely destroyed by two direct hits. Two enlisted men and one officer were killed and four enlisted men were wounded.

Thus it was demonstrated that for modern warfare, rifle companies and infantry battalions required a light, mobile, powerful rifle for close, direct fire support. As a result of battlefield experiences, it was ascertained that a weapon with a caliber of at least 57 millimeters would prove desirable. It was further desired that the weapon be light enough to be capable of being carried by one soldier to provide for mobility and flexibility in its use. Accordingly, the 57-mm rifle employing the recoilless principle of shell propulsion was designed and adopted.

The 57-mm rifle section is an organic part of each rifle company. The rifles are organized into a three-gun section

and are located in the weapons platoon. There are three such sections in an infantry battalion providing a total of nine rifles.

The 57-mm rifle section is composed of 17 enlisted men divided into a section headquarters and three identical squads of 5 men each. Section headquarters is composed of a staff sergeant, section leader, and a private, messenger. The section leader, under the direction and supervision of the weapons platoon leader, is responsible for the tactical employment of the section and the resupply of ammunition.



57-mm rifle, M18.

Each of the three squads is composed of a sergeant, squad leader; a corporal, gunner; a private or private first class, assistant gunner; and two privates or privates first class, ammunition bearers. The squad leader is armed with an M1 rifle; the gunner and assistant gunner, a .45 caliber pistol; and the ammunition bearers, carbines. A ¼-ton truck and a ¼-ton trailer are assigned to the weapons platoon headquarters for the use of the 57-mm rifle section in the transportation of its primary weapons and ammunition during administrative moves, and for the resupply of ammunition during combat.

The primary weapon of each squad is the 57-mm rifle M18. This rifle is a single-shot, hand-operated weapon which utilizes the recoilless principle of shell propulsion.

The rifle weighs 44.4 lbs and can be fired from the shoulder, from the bipod which is an integral part of the weapon, from a heavy machine-gun tripod, or from a pedestal mount in a vehicle. The rifle has a maximum range of approximately 4400 yards and is equipped with a telescopic sight graduated, as to range, in 100 yards increments up to 1800 yards; and for deflection, in 5-mil spaces. The rifle can be carried for a short distance by one individual and for long distances by two men. Ammunition for the rifle consists of high explosive (HE), high explosive, antitank (HEAT), white phosphorus (WP), target practice (TP), and inert (IN) projectiles. Each round weighs approximately 5 pounds. The weight of the rifle and its ammunition compares favorably with the weight of the 60-mm mortar and its ammunition. The rifle has a very low silhouette and this fact, coupled with its relatively low weight and the variety of ammunition available, renders the weapon highly flexible and mobile.

When fired, the 57-mm rifle produces a pronounced back blast, which necessarily influences the selection of firing positions. The position must be chosen so that the back blast has sufficient space for dissipation. No personnel must be allowed within 50 feet in rear of the rifle as serious injury or death will result if the weapon is fired while they remain in such a position. Alternate and supplementary firing positions must be chosen. Because of the danger of the weapon being observed by the enemy once fire is opened, the 57-mm rifle squad fires one mission from its primary firing position and immediately moves to a new position prior to opening fire in the accomplishment of a second mission. The back blast however, is no more conspicuous than the muzzle-blast of the 57-mm antitank gun and troops should be so instructed. It does not, therefore, make the rifle a "suicide weapon." Quite to the contrary, the weapon is a powerful addition to the fire power of a rifle company provided crews are well trained in its use and in the selection and occupation of firing positions.

The 57-mm rifle is normally employed as a direct fire weapon with front-line troops, although it may be used for



The danger area created by the back blast of the 57-mm recoilless rifle is a 30° cone extending 50-feet to the rear of the breech. Personnel located on the flanks of the danger areas should be cautioned against looking directly at the breech when the weapon is being fired.

delivering indirect fire if the tactical situation warrants. The rifle is used primarily in a close support role. To accomplish this role, the weapon is located well forward in the attack, and is effectively employed against such targets as crew-served weapons, grouped personnel, pillboxes, and armored vehicles about to overrun the friendly position. The section will remain under company control when the situation, company disposition, and terrain permit use as a section. When thus employed and suitable positions can be found, the rifles should be so emplaced as to be mutually supporting. Where the situation, company disposition, and terrain will not permit use as a section, the individual squads may be attached to rifle platoons. One or more squads may be attached to the maneuvering element of the company while the supporting squad(s) remain under weapons platoon and company control.

If the terrain permits, the 57-mm rifle section displaces forward by squad echelon. In the event the section cannot effectively support the maneuvering element immediately after capture of the objective, the squad(s) accompanying

this element may be rapidly displaced to a supporting position. Upon capture of the objective, the part of the section remaining in the base of fire displaces forward as rapidly as possible in order to resume its close support mission and to assist in repelling any counterattack against the newly won position.

Upon arrival on the objective, the section will take up positions to repel any enemy counterattack and to protect the consolidation of the position. Concurrently, they will carry out their own reorganization. Leaders will be replaced, ammunition redistributed and resupplied, and preparations concluded to resume the attack in close support of the rifle company.

In the attack, the assistant gunner and each ammunition bearer carry six rounds of ammunition. (The squad leader may also carry six rounds if necessary.) This provides sufficient ammunition to initiate combat and, at the same time, allows the squad to retain its mobility. Ammunition resupply is provided by the ammunition bearers under the supervision of the section leader. The ¼-ton truck allotted to the section is used to bring ammunition as far forward as possible. Normally, this will be the last covered position in rear of the firing positions. Ammunition bearers return to this point and hand carry the ammunition forward to their respective squads.

PART II

ACTIONS OF THE 57-MM RIFLE SECTION IN THE ATTACK

1. *Situation.* (See map, figure 4.) The 30th Infantry Regiment attacked to the NE at 0600 hours with the second and third battalions abreast, third battalion on the right. The third battalion was held up along the line GREEN HILL—DAVIDSON HILL by strong enemy resistance from positions on LONG HILL, RIDGE 70, and REYNOLDS HILL. The battalion is preparing to resume the attack with Company K on the right and Company L on the left. Company I now holds GREEN HILL and Company K is in


Reynolds Hill
Davidson Hill
Ridge 70
Holliday Hill
Green Hill
1
2
3
N
1000
500
0
1000

Sketch map.

an assembly area in the woods southwest of GREEN HILL, and will pass through Company I to resume the attack. The weapons platoon leader of Company K received the company attack order, assembled his section leaders on a vantage point on GREEN HILL, and issued the following order:

PLATOON ATTACK ORDER
(ORAL)

1. *a.* The enemy, estimated as an understrength rifle company, holds LONG HILL.

b. Our company will attack through Company I at 0900 hours, seize LONG HILL and continue the attack to the northeast. The first platoon will attack on the right, and the second platoon on the left. The third platoon will follow the first in support of the company attack. Each assault platoon will attack in a zone of action of 250 yards. Company L will attack on our left and seize RIDGE 70 and the right half of REYNOLDS HILL. (Company zone of action—see sketch.) Line of departure—Present front lines. The 7th Infantry is on our right.

2. This platoon will support the attack.

3. *a.* The 60-mm mortar section will support the attack from initial positions southwest of GREEN HILL.

b. The 57-mm rifle section, less the first squad attached to the first platoon, will support the attack from positions on GREEN HILL. The section will open fire on targets of opportunity on LONG HILL at H-hour. Upon capture of the objective, the section will displace to LONG HILL on order. The first squad will support the reorganization of the first platoon and revert to section control on the objective. Notify me when you are in position.

4. Administrative details—no change. The weapons carrier will bring ammunition forward and establish a dump in our present position.

5. *a.* Signal to lift supporting fires—red streamer. Signal to displace forward—violet smoke grenade on the objective.

b. Company command post initially in rear of GREEN HILL; thereafter along the axis of the first platoon's advance.

I will be with the company commander.

Are there any questions?

The time is now 0830 hours.

2. *First requirement.* What are the actions and orders of the section leader between the receipt of this order and the time of the attack?

3. *A solution to the first requirement.* The section leader tells his messenger to alert the section and orient them on the situation, to inform the first squad that it is attached to the first platoon effective immediately and will revert to section control as soon as it arrives on the objective, and to bring the second and third squad leaders forward. While the messenger is gone, the section leader makes his reconnaissance of GREEN HILL, selects a vantage point, determines firing position areas for the second and third squads, and waits for the return of the messenger with the squad leaders. He then returns to the vantage point, issues his order to the squad leaders and supervises movement of the second and third squads into the position areas that he previously selected. He then directs the ammunition bearers to return to the section dump and bring additional ammunition to the gun positions. Finally, he checks the gun positions, establishes an OP, and assigns sectors of fire to each squad.

4. *Second requirement.* Why did the section leader assign sectors of fire to his squads?

5. *A solution to the second requirement.* The section leader assigned a sector of fire to each gun to insure that the objective in his zone of action is adequately covered by fire. Since the platoon leader directed him to fire on targets of opportunity and did not assign him definite targets, this is

the best method by which the section leader can assure himself that a proper distribution of fire is employed against the target.

6. *Situation continued.* Company K passed through Company I and advanced approximately half way to the edge of the woods south of LONG HILL. Here the assault platoon came under intense machine-gun fire from positions near the edge of the woods (marked 1, 2, and 3 on the sketch), and the advance was stopped. From his OP, the section leader noted that machine guns at positions 1 and 2 were in open emplacements and that the machine gun at position 3 was located in a log and earth bunker. While he was observing, 60-mm mortar fire began to fall in the vicinity of positions 1 and 2.

7. *Third requirement.* How will the section leader distribute the fire of his two squads so as to most assist the advance of his company? Give a reason for your solution.

8. *A solution to the third requirement.* The section leader orders both of his squads to engage the machine gun in the pillbox at position number 3. Machine guns at 1 and 2 are in open emplacements and are relatively close together. The 60-mm mortar section should be able to destroy these weapons quickly and the rifle troops may be able to deliver enough fire against the positions to neutralize them. On the other hand, the bunker can withstand direct hits from the 60-mm mortars with little or no resultant damage, and rifle troops must fire directly into its embrasure in order to neutralize it. The 57-mm rifle, because of it accuracy and power, can quickly and effectively engage this target. In order to reduce the bunker with the least possible delay, the section leader assigns both weapons to the task.

9. *Situation continued.* The machine guns were destroyed and the first and second platoons continued their attack and captured LONG HILL. While the platoons were engaged in the consolidation of the position, the enemy launched an attack of platoon size against the newly won position from HOLLIDAY HILL. Two tanks were included

in the enemy force. The leader of the 57-mm section moved to LONG HILL immediately behind the assault platoons.

10. *Fourth requirement.* What are the actions and orders of the section leader to include: *a.* Mission for his first squad. *b.* Orders to his second and third squads. *c.* His actions thereafter.

11. *A solution to the fourth requirement.* The section leader directs the first squad to fire on the enemy force paying particular attention to the hostile tanks. He orders, by messenger, his second and third squads to displace forward, simultaneously, in order to quickly resume their close, direct fire, support mission. While awaiting the arrival of the second and third squads, the section leader makes a hasty reconnaissance and selects position areas for each squad. Upon arrival of the squads, he directs them into position, selects targets or sectors of fire for each weapon, directs the resupply of ammunition, reorganizes his section, and prepares to continue the attack.

12. *Summary.* This problem illustrates the fire support that a rifle company can logically expect from the powerful 57-mm rifle section. This support is directly dependent upon the intelligent, aggressive handling of the section by the section leader. The problem outlines the steps in troop leading procedure that the section leader must habitually and automatically follow throughout any action. Since the 57-mm rifle is primarily a direct fire weapon, aggressiveness of the section leader, and subsequently the remainder of the section, should keynote the employment of the weapon in combat if it is to be used effectively for the purpose for which it was designed—to provide close, direct support for the attacking rifle company.

An Independent Battalion in Attack at Bulalacao

An Historical Monograph

A-Day in the Philippines was 20 October 1944. The Sixth U. S. Army forced its beachheads on the eastern coast of the island of Leyte and proceeded to reduce that enemy stronghold by a double envelopment. The southern arm of this envelopment was the XXIV Corps. The northern arm was fashioned by the X Corps composed of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division, later reinforced by the 32d Infantry Division.

On 20 November 1944, with two-thirds of the island in our hands, the 19th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Division was withdrawn from the line and assembled with the 503d Parachute Infantry Combat Team and certain other units to form the Western Visayan Task Force. The mission of this task force was to seize and hold a large beachhead on the southwest coast of the island of Mindoro to provide an advanced air base for the preparation of Luzon.

The original sailing date, 1 December 1944, was deferred until 10 December 1944 while the shipping allotted to the Western Visayan Task Force was used to carry troops of the 77th Division to Ormoc, on the west side of Leyte, to complete the encirclement of the Japanese and to help crack the stubborn resistance offered in the rugged mountains of the interior.

On the afternoon of 10 December 1944, the task force embarked and rendezvoused in Leyte Gulf. It then moved southwest through the Surigao Strait, west, past the islands of Bohol and Negros, north, past Panay to San Jose, Mindoro, arriving there on the morning of 15 December 1944.

The assaults on Blue Beach and White Beach were carried out unopposed in spite of the reports indicating that there were about 200 enemy troops in the San Jose area. By evening of 15 December 1944, the infantry had seized the objectives and for the ensuing month was busily engaged in improving its positions while the engineers hastily constructed air strips on the flat coastal plain.

In the southeast sector, occupied by the 19th Infantry, the first battalion held the beach line, the third battalion held the island portion of the perimeter, and the second battalion was held in mobile reserve with positions prepared to support in event of attack from land or sea.

On the night of 19 January 1945, the executive officer of the third battalion was called to the 19th Infantry Headquarters and informed by the regimental commander that he would assume command of the second battalion the following day. Both officers then reported to Visayan Task Force Headquarters for a conference with the chief of staff and S-2. In this conference, such information as was available was discussed concerning a strong party of Japanese reported on the far side of the island. The information may be reduced to the following:

(1) The estimated 250 troops were believed to be the long lost original garrison of San Jose under the command of Captain Tanaka, a Japanese officer about 40-45 years old, who had apparently ruled San Jose area with something more than a hand of iron.

(2) The location was about five miles inland in the mountains on the west of the Bulalacao River Valley. An officer from Company E, 19th Infantry, had been sent three days before, with three guerrillas and an SCR 284, to ascertain the general location of these Japanese troops, if they actually existed. On the evening of 19 January 1945, the officer had reported location of an observation post from which he had observed the Japanese troops for several hours.

(3) There were no maps of the area except a limited supply of 1:200,000 Manila Coast and Geodetic Survey of the entire island of Mindoro. No specific information was


LUMINTAO R.
BUGSANGA R.
SAN JOSE
BLUE BEACH
WHITE BEACH
LABANGAN R.
CAGURAY R.
ILIN
AMBOLONI
21 JANUARY 1945
2 19 23 Jan
2 19 22 Jan
MALIAW
COAL
BULALACAO R.
BULALACAO
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MINDORO
SCALE 1:200,000

Map 1.

available to task force headquarters concerning the nature of the terrain.

(4) The Filipinos reported the enemy well equipped and armed with several machine guns, at least one of which was a caliber .50 or equivalent. They also reported the presence of an excellent powerful radio transmitter.

(5) The Japanese troops were reported by the civilians to be driving them from their farms and appropriating the produce.

At 1000 on 20 January 1945, the commander of the second battalion was notified by regimental S-3 that the movement previously discussed had apparently been cancelled.

At 1200 on 20 January 1945, warning orders were telephoned to the battalion commander to prepare to move the second battalion minus two platoons of F Company (then on separate missions) to Bulalacao on the southeast shore of Mindoro. The battalion commander was to report immediately to task force headquarters for orders. The gist of the orders issued verbally by the chief of staff follows:

(1) Enemy information previously discussed.

(2) Move the 2d Bn (-), 19th Inf., to Bulalacao by water on the night of 20-21 January 1945.

(3) The mission is to find and destroy the enemy force bivouacking northwest of Bulalacao. Ten days will be allowed to complete the mission.

(4) Truck transportation will be provided to move the troops to White Beach. Five LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry) and one LCM (Landing Craft, Medium) will be on White Beach at 1500 to be loaded. The battalion will take three units of fire and ten rations (six "K" and four "10 in 1").

(5) One jeep-mounted SCR 193 will be provided to maintain contact with task force headquarters. Two operators will be provided by regimental headquarters. Brief daily unit reports by radio are required.

After issuing the order, the chief of staff impressed on the battalion commander that the local air force headquarters was very desirous of carrying out air strikes in support of ground troops. He emphasized that any profitable

opportunity for an air strike should be seized in the absence of artillery.

BATTALION ORDER

The battalion commander returned to his unit and conferred with his staff. The details of the task force order were given to them and upon the arrival of the company commanders, the following fragmentary battalion order was issued:

(1) Enemy located in the vicinity of Bulalacao, strength estimated 250; the far shore is undefended.

(2) The battalion will move to Bulalacao by water the night of 20-21 January 1945. Mission—to destroy the enemy group.

(3) H Company will exchange four of the heavy machine guns for light machine guns and leave four of their 81-mm mortars with the rear detachment. Headquarters company will leave the antitank platoon as rear detachment with one man from each company as additional guards. On arrival at the far shore, one platoon of E Company will outpost the town, reconnoiter the trails, and set up security patrols. All other troops will immediately start unloading supplies and transferring them to dumps which the S-4 will designate. The battalion command post will open ashore ten minutes after landing. All companies will open SCR 300s on channel 6 as soon as beached. Any other pertinent instructions will be issued at that time.

The troops were at their designated location on White Beach a few minutes before 1500 and service company had delivered the rations, ammunition, 20 miles of W-130 wire, and three extra SCR 300s.

At this time an officer from Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 9, reported and said that he had been directed by task force headquarters to accompany the battalion and assist in any way possible. He carried a large sum of money with which to hire civilian labor.

The unit was loaded, one company to each LCI, and supplies were equally distributed to all craft. The jeep-mounted SCR 193 was loaded on the LCM. One extra ration of

"10 in 1" was provided for voyage ration. For easy liaison, battalion headquarters and headquarters company was loaded on the LCI of the flotilla commander.

After final checks were made, all commanders boarded their respective craft. Ramps were raised, bow doors closed, and the convoy of five LCIs, one with the LCM tied along side, swung at anchor in the roadstead waiting the departure hour of 2200.

At dawn 21 January 1945, the convoy was moving slowly into Bulalacao Bay. The flotilla commander was cautious since the chart showed that there was a reef along the shore; however, naval intelligence believed that it would not impede the beaching of LCIs and LCMs at high tide. He moved in with his vessel and ran aground 150 yards from shore where the water was five feet deep. The third attempt finally succeeded in getting the craft within 20 yards of the shore where the water was three feet deep. Obviously, there would be no improvement in the landing situation, so the order to disembark was given.

The battalion commander with his command group, waded ashore to greet the lieutenant from Company E who had preceded the battalion. The command group, consisting of the battalion commander, executive officer, S-2, S-3, and some communications personnel, moved into the unpretentious town hall where the officer gave his report. In essence, the report included the following facts:

(1) The lieutenant and his group had experienced some difficulty in securing guides since most of the civilians were extremely afraid of the enemy.

(2) The enemy position was considerably farther to the northwest than the task force headquarters believed, but due to the fact that the guides had led him to the area by a somewhat circuitous route, he was unable to give an accurate estimate of the distance.

(3) The terrain was rough, but not excessively so.

(4) He had located an observation post about 800 yards from the enemy across a deep draw from which he was able to watch the enemy the morning of 19 January 1945. During the afternoon, he had moved down to the creek at the

bottom of the draw where he was able to watch the creek bank and see several of the enemy come and go with water buckets.

(5) Satisfied that he had found the enemy, he returned to Bulalacao with his party and two Manyan guides, natives of the hill country.

After discussing this report with the staff officers, the battalion commander decided that nothing could be gained by remaining in the town and that the sooner the unit could be on its way, the better chance there would be of finding more information.

The S-4 had already located his dumps, posted guides to them, and informed all companies by radio of the locations of the dumps. The executive officer left the temporary command post to supervise the unloading. The S-3 was sent to reconnoiter the town for suitable assembly areas. His recommendations, returned in a few minutes, were approved, and the companies notified to move to their respective areas and to eat lunch as soon as the dumps were completed.

A check of the outposts by the S-2 showed that the few civilians who had come into town were amazed to find American troops, indicating that the news of the landing had not yet reached the outlying areas.

The Philippine Civil Affairs officer who accompanied the battalion ashore, was instructed:

(1) To locate and hire whatever number of men the S-4 might need to act as carriers.

(2) To prepare to augment the manpower of the trains with carabao (native beasts of burden) if the conditions of the trails warranted it.

(3) To get the civilians to return to town, have the area policed, and start the reorganization of civil government.

(4) To locate a civilian who spoke good English and to make a loyalty check on the man.

The product of the last instruction was Adolpho, a twenty-eight-year-old graduate of the University of the Philippines who spoke excellent English, Tagalog, and Manyan, the language of the hill people (the guides), in addition to

native Visayan. He was the principal of the local school and in conversation, gave every evidence of high intelligence.

By 1200 all dumps had been completed and the troops were messing in their respective areas. The company commanders were called to the battalion command post in the town hall to receive the following order:

(1) The S-2, gave a summary of everything known about the enemy. The battalion commander added that anything, regardless of how inconsequential it seemed, be reported immediately to promote the production of combat intelligence in the hope that complete surprise might be achieved.

(2) The battalion will bivouac for the night near a coal mine (map No. 1).

(3) Order of march: First platoon, Company E, (the present outpost) acting as an advance guard, will move out at 1300, preceding the main body by fifteen minutes, followed by the balance of Company E with security also out. Company G, Headquarters, and Company H will follow in that order, and Company F will perform the rear guard mission. A three-man reconnaissance patrol will be sent from Company E across the Bulalacao River to move north to Maliaw, a small village, and return to the battalion. Its mission is to search for signs and news of the enemy on the battalion's right flank. The ammunition and pioneer platoon is directed to remain at base to act as security for the communications and dumps. They will also take over the task of guarding the supply trains.

(4) The 2d platoon, Company H will leave their heavy machine guns at base with the ammunition and pioneer officer because of the anticipated rugged terrain and to assist in protection of the base. Members of this platoon will become additional ammunition bearers for Company H.

(5) Wire will be laid from base as the main body moves forward. The advance guard commander will be given one of the extra SCR 300's on Channel 6.

The two Manyan guides were called in by Adolpho, the interpreter, and questioned by the battalion commander for

general data concerning the trails. The native language is so simple that it necessitates considerable talk to make even a slightly complex idea clear. The outcome of the conversation was that the question, "How many trails go from Bulalacao to the Japs' place?", drew the answer, "Two trails. One goes up the river valley, the other goes through the mountains on the west side of the river valley."

When the decision was made to move up the valley trail because of speed of movement and ease of supply, the guides were informed. One man said, "Yes, good." The other poured out an angry torrent of words for several minutes. Adolpho translated this as, "The mountain trail is better." Apparently due to language failure, the guide could give no adequate reason for his statement. The man who approved of going up the valley was sent with one of the guerrillas accompanying the advance guard, who spoke some English and some Manyan, to report to the commander. The one who objected so strongly was designated to go with the main body. This was to insure that the advance guard followed the correct trail, and the main body would simply follow them.

At 1300, the advance guard moved out followed by the main body at 1315. The second guide, who was at the head of the main body, was assisting the lead scouts of the main body by gestures. By 1630 the main body had moved about four miles. The country was becoming increasingly rough and there was no sign of the river. The battalion commander contacted the advance guard for their location. They reported their position to be about two miles from the coal mine which was their immediate objective. They also reported that the trail frequently ran along the river. Obviously, the main body was on the mountain trail which the second guide had persisted in using. (There should have been closer supervision of the guide.) There were only two things to do: back track to rejoin the advance guard, or continue on the mountain trail previously rejected. Cross country was out of the question inasmuch as the terrain toward the river was mountainous. The battalion commander decided to push on. The guide had ample opportunity to lead the advance guard into a trap if he were


AREA OF OPERATION
2d Bn 19th Infantry
23-27 Jan 1945
N
VALLEY TRAIL
TJ #2
1G 19
24 Jan
1G 19
1615
24 Jan
E 19
1715
24 Jan
BY PASS TRAIL
G 19(-)
1800
24 Jan
G 19(-)
1615
24 Jan
TJ #4
2 19
24 Jan
F 19(-)
TJ #3
E 19


BY PASS TRAIL
MOUNTAIN TRAIL
2 19
H 19
2 Hq 19
G 19 (-)
24 Jan
2 19 (-)
Night 23 – 24 Jan
0
500
1000
YARDS

Map 2.

so inclined and, consequently, the decision was based on the desire to avoid further loss of time. The advance guard was directed to complete their move to the coal mine and rejoin the main body the next day. Thus they would serve as a flank screen. Both columns resumed their respective moves, and at 1800 the advance guard commander reported himself at the coal mine, no enemy contact, and going into bivouac.

A communication schedule was set up by the communications officer and the main body continued to move. There had been no terrain satisfactory for bivouac for more than an hour. A few minutes after 1800 the main body crossed a good stream and came out on a large grassy field which, under the circumstances, would serve as a bivouac area. The sun had already set and it was growing dark so the battalion formed a perimeter astride the trail.

After coordination of weapons had been checked, the battalion commander called the executive officer and S-3 to his foxhole and told them that the battalion would remain in bivouac the following day, and that he felt reconnaissance was in order because the unit must be close to the enemy area. The executive officer suggested pushing on in order to lose no time. The battalion commander, however, did not desire to risk a meeting engagement and so decided to start three reconnaissance patrols at 0630 the following day. One was to be an officer-led three man patrol accompanied by one of the guerrillas. It would move forward along the trail in order to learn how far the unit was from the enemy, if they could be located. The other two patrols were to go upstream and downstream along the creek to check on the flanks.

Over the telephone to base, the S-4 was instructed to bring 1⅓ rations forward the following day. He reported that the base was quiet and very few civilians were present. The communications officer requested that the ration train carry a clip-on phone in order to have two way communication at any time and also so that the train guard could service the wire as it moved. This procedure later proved to be a valuable time saver.

At 0630, the patrols moved out and the local security was checked by the S-3. The staff gathered to compare notes and check on the information available.

About 1300 when the troops were eating, the bivouac was startled by a single shot from the right of the trail in front of E Company's right. The company commander took half a squad to investigate. They returned in about fifteen minutes, leaving two men to stand security, because the two-man outpost had disappeared. Another patrol was sent to search the area beyond the outpost. While the company commander was reporting the situation and explaining what he had done, a sergeant from G Company brought the two men who had been on outpost duty to the command post. The two men, both new, told their story in jumbled sentences. While eating lunch and neither man was on guard, a shot passed "between them." They grabbed their rifles and "hurried back to tell the captain they had been shot at by a Jap." By a single violation of security, the element of surprise was apparently lost.

The S-2 contacted the advance guard commander on the radio to check his position which was now on the main body's trail since he was following the telephone wire. He also told him what had happened and cautioned him to keep his eyes open and join the battalion as soon as possible.

Shortly before 1500, a blast of rifle fire from the rear shattered the air. The two patrols which had been checking the creek line had just reported to S-2, "No enemy contact," as had the E Company patrol to the front.

The battalion commander grabbed the transmitter of the SCR 300 and contacted the advance guard station. The battalion commander asked, "Do you need any help, Buster?"

The voice at the other end replied, "No, I'll call back. I'm busy now."

The firing continued for five minutes with quite a volume of M1 and BAR fire punctuated by the sharper sound of the Jap caliber .25s. Suddenly, the Jap fire stopped and then there was a concentrated explosion of rifle and BAR fire which grew in volume and died away to nothing. The

advance guard commander radioed that he was moving in and would report on arrival. The firing had been very near so he should arrive in a short time.

Half an hour later he told his story: About five minutes after talking to the S-2, the scouts halted and signaled him. Just coming into a small open space at the far side and a little below them, was a party of Japs moving carelessly. He had slipped back and moved the lead squad to one side and the next squad to the other. The woods was quite open—more like that of a temperate zone— and due to good scouting, the enemy party still didn't know his platoon was in the vicinity. The Japs finally woke up but two squads were already deployed. When one of the Japs fired the first shot, there was an overwhelming return fire. Shortly after this, while the last squad was coming up, the battalion commander had called. The commander took the last squad around the west flank and partly to the rear which placed them in an advantageous position. There were thirteen dead Japs laying in the area at the end of the action. However, during the action, the advance guard commander had counted fourteen enemy while the first two squad leaders had counted twelve and thirteen. It was possible that one Jap had escaped and would be able to report the presence of the American troops. The Japs were apparently a foraging party as most of them had sacks of vegetables.

The ration train accompanied by the ammunition and pioneer platoon, joined the main body a few minutes later. The eighty Filipinos were grinning and chattering about the dead Japs along the trail.

The security patrol sent to the front returned at 1700 and reported that there was still a long way to go, and that the terrain became quite steep although the trail was fairly good. The guerrilla had finally started to recognize the terrain and was able to point out the observation post previously occupied by the E Company officer. From this point, they watched the Japs through glasses for about an hour at lunch time. The patrol left the observation post about 1300 and took nearly four hours to return at top speed. The leader estimated that the battalion, moving as

a unit, would not be able to arrive at that area before 1600 the next afternoon.

The S-2 believed that the Jap observed by the outpost was part of the group destroyed that day. He recommended continuing on the premise that the enemy could still be surprised because he had learned that the security patrol had not heard the firing, and they had arrived at the perimeter ninety minutes after the action was concluded.

The patrol from Maliaw returned with a negative report.

The march order for 0630, 23 January 1945, was issued to the company commanders. Advance guard, G Company; F, H, Headquarters following; and E Company would constitute the rear guard.

The march of 23 January proved the validity of the decision to leave the heavy weapons at base for the few on hand controlled the rate of march. The march proceeded without incident until late in the afternoon when the scouts stopped near a native shack on a steep decline. All companies were directed to put out security and make a long halt. Adolpho, who had been moving along very quietly, now became the most important link in the unit. He questioned one of the native men but was unable to get any coherent information from him. At this time the native chief arrived and confirmed the suspicion that the first informant was mentally deficient.

It was learned that it was the chief's farm and village which the Japs were occupying. When the question of how many enemy were there arose, an impasse was reached because the natives count only to twenty and can conceive of no greater number. The Manyans, according to Adolpho, are extremely honest as a race and since Adolpho knew of the chief by reputation, he was sure we could accept any information from him as truthful. The chief said that he had just come from the Jap bivouac area and that he had seen five machine guns. When asked about the reported caliber .50 he took his quiver of arrows, his bow, and another stick, formed a tripod, and then made motions of looking through a telescope—a transit!

There were three trails leading into the village. The Japs had an observation post on the river valley trail all day. The village was on the nose of the next mountain to the northeast. There was another trail which lead to the northwest farther into the mountains.

This information was discussed and a basic plan formed to block all three trails and attack along the one the battalion was following. Did the chief know the way to the junction of the by-pass trail and the river valley trail (TJ #2—see map No. 2)? Yes, but he wouldn't lead any troops there because the Japs could see. How could the troops be placed on the last trail? The answer was obvious and after some persuasion, the chief agreed to guide the troops at night.

The S-2 and S-3 returned to the battalion command post in the perimeter with Adolpho and the chief and reported the results of further questioning. The trail the unit was on continued to the northeast for about 1000 yards and then climbed a steep hill where it joined the by-pass trail. To reach the valley trail (TJ #2—see Map No. 2) it would be necessary to move down the present trail and turn right at the next trail junction (TJ No. 4—see Map No. 2). From trail junction #1, turning to the left would lead to the northwest and trail junction #3. The general characteristics of the three trails leading into the village were: (1) the valley trail led up a steep slope, (2) the mountain trail went up a steep slope, and (3) the trail from trail junction #3 was down hill nearly all the way to the village except the last part which was a gentle slope up. Both the S-2 and the S-3 reccommended that the main effort be made from trail junction #3 on the down hill grade. This would be the best possible move, and if tactical surprise could be gained in any way, this should be the direction. Also, if the enemy had learned of the presence of American troops in the area, a move from his rear should be demoralizing.

At approximately 1645, a security patrol from the trail toward base reported the ration train only ten minutes down the trail and moving in. The S-2 soon came to the battalion command post and reported that a recount of the

dead Japs at the scene of the previous days action revealed that the fourteenth Jap had been found about 50 yards away from the others. Apparently, he had been mortally wounded and had crawled toward the creek.

At this point the S-2 situation was very good. The possibility of the enemy's being aware of the presence of American troops was reduced to a minimum. The information concerning terrain was fairly complete and given by a man whose reputation was vouched for by Adolpho, and who should heartily dislike the Japs inasmuch as he had been dispossessed of his farms and village by them.

It was decided at this time to execute the following plan early the next morning:

(1) Block trail junction #2 by sending one rifle platoon of G Company (reinforced with a LMG section) to that trail junction via the by-pass trail at 2000.

(2) Block trail junction #1 with the remainder of G Company.

(3) Block trail junction #3 with F Company which would (a) act as reserve, (b) protect the left flank of the battalion and cover the rear of E Company, and (c) catch any enemy by-passed by E Company in the attack.

(4) Attack the enemy rear with E Company, which was at full strength, southeast from trail junction #3.

(5) Of G Company's two positions, trail junction #2 protected the right flank, trail junction #1 protected the rear, and both prevented any escape sorties by the enemy. Both positions would be prepared to attack from their respective directions in support of E Company, on order.

(6) H Company's mortars would support by fire from positions along the by-pass trail between trail junctions #1 and #3.

(7) The battalion command post and aid station would be located along the by-pass trail between trail junctions #1 and #3.

(8) An air strike was to be requested for 1100 hours the following day.

The battalion order involving the previously described missions and positions was issued. The extra one-third ration which each company had been carrying in bulk was

issued with the one and one-third that the ration train brought in, thus insuring rations through breakfast 25 January. Due to the long trip, the ration train would be unable to return to the battalion before 1200 on 25 January even though they started at 0530 and used the good trail up the valley.

The S-3 drafted a message to task force headquarters requesting an air strike at 1100 on 24 January. The executive officer requested that a liaison plane from the 13th Field Artillery Battalion carrying an SCR 300 be sent over the area thirty minutes prior to the hour of the air attack.

The battalion position could not be accurately plotted on the 1:200,000 map since it showed no detail, the trails were not correct, and no landmarks could be observed in the jungle. The liaison plane could locate the troops accurately by flying over and checking by radio. After the liaison plane located the troops and approximate target area, he could intercept the armed planes and indicate the white phosphorus target markers which the mortar platoon was prepared to fire. A statement was also included in the air strike request that there would be troops 800 yards from the target area to the southeast, southwest, west, and northwest since 800 yards was the local air safety factor. The message was classified urgent, and telephoned to base in code, then radioed to task force headquarters.

The perimeter was checked, evening security patrols were started and the battalion sat down to its "K" ration supper. Suddenly, from G Company area a single shot was fired. A hasty investigation revealed that a man had accidentally fired his BAR while cleaning it. Once again the secrecy which had been thus far maintained, was in jeopardy.

At 2000 the G Company platoon, guided by the chief, moved silently out of the perimeter along the trail, their way lighted by moonlight filtering through the trees. At 0100 the platoon leader reported himself in position. He was cautioned not to fire on any Japs until he had been seen, or until mortar fire announced the start of the attack.

At this time a message came from task force headquarters. "Air strike approved, Hour of strike, 1230 hours,

13th Field Artillery liaison plane ordered to report on air station 1230."

Morning dawned bright and clear and breakfast was hurriedly eaten. The battalion moved out; G Company with a section of H Company's light machine guns attached, went into position at trail junction #1. F Company moved on and reported itself in position at trail junction #3 with E Company passing through. By 1000 hours the battalion command post and aid station were both set up about 300 yards to the northwest of G Company. All units were instructed to post local security and get what rest was possible in the next two and a half hours. The battalion command group moved along the face of the hill looking for an observation post. About 1030 an excellent one was found and the commander and staff spent the ensuing two hours in studying the enemy with field glasses. They appeared to be entirely ignorant of the presence of hostile units. The scheduled liaison plane arrived at 1230. Communication was established and the plane located most of the American positions and identified the enemy target. Three shots were heard from trail block #1 area and the leader reported two enemy had been killed within 5 yards of his position.

The air strike was late. When three P-47s appeared in the area at 1330 it was assumed that they were the support mission. The white phosphorus target rounds were fired. The liaison plane rose to intercept the planes but they flew on. The damage was done. The enemy had reacted violently, indicating that he was completely surprised. All units, however, were in positions still unknown to the enemy. At 1420 the battalion commander sent the following message to task force headquarters: "STOP THE AIR STRIKE. REPLY WHEN CLEAR TO ATTACK." This message was classified urgent and sent in the clear. The troops were forced to wait an additional period of time since a chance could not be taken that the air strike would not arrive and bomb the attacking troops. During the wait, the mortars were directed to be ready to prepare the area with 54 rounds in three section targets on different parts of the village area on order.

At about 1445 the message came in: "Strike cancelled." E Company was directed to move out at once and complied quickly. Immediately, the mortar fire started and was completed in about five minutes. In about ten minutes the first firing started from E Company, but they seemed to be meeting no resistance for no enemy fire could be distinguished. The company commander reported every ten minutes and his progress could be followed by the sound of rifle and BAR fire moving along the far side of the draw. E Company's small-arms fire grew in volume and seemed to come from the whole length of the company. Surprised by the mortar fire, and apparently expecting an attack from the southeast, the Japs fled for the safety of the mountains only to find the main effort advancing along their line of retreat. At 1530, G Company at trail junction #1 and the platoon at trail junction #2 were directed to close on the objective. Both units reported themselves on the move in a few minutes. Shortly thereafter, sporadic firing was heard from both columns. Constant check was kept on their progress by radio, and about 1615 both units were halted at the bottom of the steep slopes and deployed to snare any fleeing enemy. They were warned of E Company's advance and cautioned to watch for American troops.

E Company called by radio and asked for a smoke shell on the objective area. At this time they were appraised of G Company's situation and directed to confine their movements to the hill top. The smoke shell was fired and landed only about 50 yards ahead of the lead scouts. E Company deployed. The trap was closed. From the observation post, through binoculars, the command group had a clear picture of two platoons sweeping through the village, routing the enemy from the shacks with grenades and assault fire.

E Company reported that they had overrun the whole village and farm area, patrolled into the edge of the woods around the farm, and were assembling on the high ground near the end of the nose. They were informed that G Company would be closing on their position and to alert their troops to that fact.

G Company started up the slope on either side of the nose and reported the ascent extremely difficult because of steepness and the muddy surface of the trail. By the time both elements of G Company had closed on the objective area, it was nearly 1800 so the G Company commander, the senior officer, was placed in command of the two company bivouac, and F Company was ordered to remain in position for the night. Headquarters Company and H Company bivouacked in position and the staff drafted the unit report. One and one-third rations were ordered from base.

During the night, several shots were heard from F Company and after the first light, they reported half a dozen Japs who had been by-passed by E Company had walked into their machine-gun section. Headquarters Company and H Company moved to the objective area, nearly an hour and half being necessary for the march. E and G Companies were patrolling opposite sides of the nose and had already collected a sizeable pile of enemy equipment. The radio which task force headquarters wanted captured, unfortunately, had been set afire by one of the smoke rounds. However, the radio section salvaged all recognizeable parts. The pile of captured ordnance included: 1 Jap heavy machine gun, 2 Jap light machine guns, 2 or 3 Jap drum fed Air Corps machine guns, 2 Browning air-cooled Air Corps machine guns, 2 grenade dischargers or "knee mortars", more than 50 Ariska Rifles caliber .256, and the American made transit which had been used on the Jap observation post.

The most important item was a brief case filled with maps and papers. It was recovered from one of the first enemy dead by E Company's command group. The body it was taken from had a captain's insignia. Apparently, the late Captain Tanaka (the body was later identified by Adolpho and two civilians) had headed the stampede to escape. Among the maps in the brief case was one which showed down to the last squad, the entire disposition of the Western Visayan Task Force in the southwest beachhead including the second battalion's unoccupied, prepared positions.

Patrolling during the rest of the day netted only a few more enemy casualties, and with the arrival of the ration train about 1330, it was decided to return to base the following morning.

A BAR man changed this plan, however, by returning from the creek with a prisoner. The interpreter, Adolpho, with a mixture of Tagalog, Visayan, and Japanese could make himself partially understood. After an hour's effort these facts seemed apparent:

(1) The Japs had been terrified by the mortar fire announcing the presence of Americans.

(2) The prisoner had been even more frightened on hearing firing from all sides and had run into the jungle to hide.

(3) By running to the northwest, the Japs had hoped to join another group about 7 kilometers away. The prisoner didn't know its number, perhaps twenty. He had never seen them or been to their camp.

(4) A fourteen man foraging party had been sent out five days before and had never returned.

(5) He identified the captured brief case as belonging to Captain Tanaka.

The battalion executive officer was instructed to take G Company, F Company, one of the Manyan guides, and Adolpho as interpreter, to locate and destroy the additional group of Japs. Two hours later, this force reported that F Company scouts had heard some Japs coming along the trail toward them so the company quickly set up a platoon ambush and sprang it on nine Japs, killing them all. The force bivouacked in a valley a mile or so from its objective. On 26 January when the village was overrun, signs of the enemy were found but were a week or more old. The force was then instructed to rejoin the main body.

On the morning of 27 January, the column started toward base at 0630, and after a half hour halt for lunch, closed on Bulalacao at 1400.

The entire aspect of the town was changed. It was literally teaming with civilians. The Civil Affairs officer had done an excellent job. The tall weeds were gone, the grass had all been cut, and flower beds previously lost in the

weeds, were dressed. The houses looked clean and the school house had been cleared out and was ready for the resumption of instruction the following Monday. Four oil drum showers had been constructed for the use of the townspeople. The mayor and chief of police were back in office.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In analyzing this operation it is necessary to remember:

(1) It occured during a mop-up phase and, as such, had very little significance in the large tactical picture of the operation from which it stemmed.

(2) With their equipment—machine guns, knee mortars, and rifles—and the number of men available, the enemy, properly commanded, could have inflicted considerable casualties and either delayed the accomplishment of the mission or, by a well planned withdrawal deep into the mountains, denied it entirely.

(3) The disparity of numbers does not in any way alter the fact that the Japanese force could have accomplished either of the foregoing capabilities.

INTELLIGENCE

The initial information given to the battalion commander was at best sketchy and in several respects erroneous. The only available map of the area was the 1:200,000 Manila Coast and Geodetic Survey of which seven copies were issued. The battalion commander was to use this as a situation map. It plotted nothing but the higher mountain peaks and larger streams. The trail net shown was almost entirely incorrect, many trails apparently having been overgrown or relocated while others were new or unplotted.

The first reliable information received was from the E Company officer who had seen the enemy and the terrain immediately surrounding their location. The practice of sending officers on scout missions was most valuable to the incoming unit. This officer's foresight in having guides immediately available saved considerable time. As the enemy had already been located, the unit's task was shortened accordingly.

The controlling factor of the whole operation was the determination to accomplish the mission by surprise if

possible. If surprise had been lost, it would have been necessary to attack the enemy with the least possible delay and their complete destruction would have been nearly impossible. Every effort, therefore, was directed toward maintaining secrecy.

The security patrol to the front established several facts:

(1) That the trail reconnoitered led the battalion into the enemy's flank;

(2) That even though there had been a sharp encounter while in the hills between the enemy main position and the fire fight, the patrol had not heard the firing—consequently, the enemy probably had heard nothing;

(3) That observation of the enemy held village gave no evidence of any excitement and no enemy patrols were encountered. The leader of the original advance guard platoon was positive that his count of the enemy was accurate and he was convinced that he had killed the whole foraging party. The S-2 reasoned that most probably one had crawled away wounded. His request that the count be rechecked was a very practical solution. Confirmation of this theory gave credence to the belief that surprise could still be obtained.

The information secured from the native chief on terrain and trails was sufficient to gain tactical surprise in the direction of attack, and to allow the enemy to be completely surrounded. Also, his statement that the enemy was still in the area where they had been observed previously, supported the belief that the enemy was unaware of the presence of American troops.

OPERATIONS

(1) *Enemy operations:* The enemy commander apparently had at his disposal about one hundred naval troops armed with an unusual amount of automatic weapons and several knee mortars which he could have used to advantage. After occupying his position, he must have failed to reconnoiter the trail net or he surely would have realized that his rear could be circled on the by-pass trail. If this were not true, he committed a more serious error by assuming that his

enemies would not use the mountain trail, and in this instance, he underestimated the hill people's ability as an enemy.

His security was faulty in many ways. Principally, only one observation post was established, and no effective security patrols were maintained. The foraging party, upon finding even one American soldier should, immediately, have sent a runner with the information. This could only be the result of a faulty command policy on security.

The completeness of the map of the American southwest beachhead, leads to the feeling that the principal task of the commander was to secure information of the American position. Regardless of his primary mission, he failed because of faulty security.

Due to the error in marking the air strike, the enemy was allowed about an hour to recover from the surprise of the two smoke rounds, but failed to achieve even partial reorganization. This was evidenced by the fact that the main effort received no return fire of any kind, and that the Japanese commander, among the first to be killed, had lost all control and organization.

(2) *Friendly operations*: In the initial planning, the decision to leave four of the mortars and the antitank platoon with the rear echelon was prompted by the belief that the terrain would be difficult. This decision proved to be correct.

Even though the landing was unopposed, the factor of security was taken into account. The first important error was made when the guides were improperly coordinated and the main body was led along the mountain trail, thus becoming separated from the advance guard. It was likewise poor command judgement to make a snap decision to use the valley trail without making a reconnaissance.

The decision to start immediately on the move toward the enemy was correct because combat intelligence can only be produced when a unit is close to the enemy.

The decision to send a platoon to block the southeast entrance to the Japanese bivouac was prompted by the desire to deny the enemy all routes of egress.

The native chief's refusal to guide this platoon during daylight forced the decision to move at night and was the critical point in the maneuver. The move was well conducted since it avoided detection. After the leading platoon had reported itself in position without contacting the enemy, the remainder of the disposition required only time.

The initial attack plan, which would have struck the enemy in the flank, was abandoned in favor of the more obvious advantages of making the main effort from the northwest because of the relative merits of the terrain, and to achieve the maximum tactical advantage.

The position taken by H Company mortars was ideal. It gave defilade, and they were able to support E Company by firing at 90° to that company's line of advance. The best observation in the area was within one hundred yards of the weapons.

The position selected for F Company was a compromise. There was no information as to the other enemy troops which might be farther inland, but security prompted that the battalion's left flank and the rear of E Company be protected. The reserve mission given to F Company could have been fulfilled easily on the left flank, which would have been the most decisive location. However, on any other part of the front, much time would have been consumed in getting these troops into action. This weakness was recognized and accepted in view of the other advantages.

G Company, by blocking the junction of the mountain trail and the by-pass trail, was able to provide the rear protection while a platoon secured the right flank. Warning these two units to be prepared to move forward on order was repaid later by rapid execution. If E Company's attack had been seriously resisted, the additional attacks of the other two units from a different direction would have overcome enemy resistance.

The battalion commander selected the position between trail junction #1 and trail junction #3 for the battalion command post because the flanks and rear were protected, and he could have easy access to the service of the staff

when necessary. The observation post selected for the battle position was far above average for the theater and, in addition, it gave the necessary straight line broadcast for the control of units by radio.

The air strike which was requested was not necessary. The destruction of the enemy was accomplished completely by surprise. The failure of coordination of the air strike was due to an inadequate system of communication between ground and air forces. To control air strikes properly, an air liaison officer should be present with the unit to be supported. There were three bad results from the scheduled strike: (1) the hour of attack was deferred in order that the troops might take advantage of the air support; (2) the air force deferred the time of the strike to a point which gave the troops a minimum of daylight time to fight; (3) the armed planes were still warming up on the ground when the strike was called off at which time it was already two hours late. Thus, the period from 1000 until 1445 when the strike was canceiled was entirely wasted.

EVACUATION AND SUPPLY

The battalion aid station was placed near the command post and had the same security. This was the best area to give medical support to the bulk of the battalion. No provision was made for the medical support of the platoon at road block #2 since they had such a small force. In case of a segregated organization, such as a reinforced platoon, at least one additional aid man should have been sent to support that unit until positive contact was re-established. Evacuation was to be carried out by the ration train on its return to base the following day. In the event that the attack was unsuccessful the first day, the only means of evacuation open to the segregated platoon was to evacuate their own casualties down the valley trail and inform the battalion which would in turn direct base to send a party up that trail to complete the evacuation. Serious cases could be evacuated from base by PT boats on a radio request to task force headquarters.

The supply system set up by the S-4 worked without any serious difficulties. It might have been improved some-

what if there had been enough guards to run two trains when the distance from base was extended.

COMMUNICATIONS

The communications throughout the operation were excellent with no failures of radio, and the only failures of wire were one case of shorting which was corrected by utilizing ground return circuit, (the standing operating procedure), and a broken wire serviced by the ration train guard.

The use of radio to control and coordinate the maneuvers of the companies was entirely successful because each unit responded quickly in executing each succeeding order.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

The assistance given to the battalion by the civil affairs officer from Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 9 was outstanding. Not only had he assisted the supply officer as required, but he exerted every effort to collect the civil populace, to clean up the town, start the school, and re-establish the normal civil organization which would speed the recovery of the community.

EVALUATION

The mission was determined successful because the enemy was destroyed:

(1) Eighty nine Japanese were killed and one captured. The prisoner believed the strength of his unit was eighty five to ninety men.

(2) The mission was actually complete by the evening of the fifth day.

(3) The only American casualty was a man scratched on the lip by a fragment of a grenade with which a Jap committed suicide.

LESSONS

Some of the lessons to be learned from this operation are:

(1) In mountain operations, where trails are steep, slippery, and narrow, the speed of a unit's route march is in

inverse proportion to the complement of heavy weapons carried.

(2) The practice of preceding an amphibious operation by competent scouts is vitally important to the tactical commander, for otherwise, the initial phase of the operation must be utilized in reconnaissance. Secrecy can hardly be maintained when extensive patrolling is required.

(3) A versatile interpreter is invaluable to a unit operating in foreign territory.

(4) In posting security, commanders must be careful to leaven each outpost with experienced soldiers. The use of inexperienced personnel jeopardizes the unit's security.

(5) Troop movements which are rendered impracticable by enemy observation in daylight, may often be accomplished under cover of darkness.

(6) A good intelligence officer can produce sufficient combat intelligence in the field to influence the success of an operation.

(7) Because the SCR 300 requires straight line broadcast, this characteristic must be considered in locating control stations in order to retain efficient tactical control.

(8) In mountainous terrain where no roads exist, man-carry and pack animal are the most effective means of supply.

(9) Never underestimate the potentialities of the enemy. Even primitive tribes are capable of effecting retribution against an enemy.

(10) A unit subsisting through foraging must be doubly alert because natives can usually ill afford to subsist a military unit, and therefore, will ally themselves with the enemy.

(11) Careful planning, good staff work, and sound tactics will produce victory at a cost far smaller than is usually realized.

(12) Violation of the principle of security invites disaster.

(13) A stampede of individuals, as opposed to an organized withdrawal, may result in annihilation.

Supply by Air

This is the second of a series of articles to be published in this medium on a subject which is destined to become of increasing importance to ground force personnel—air transportability. Like the chapter entitled "Movement of Troops By Air" in Volume XXX, THE MAILING LIST, *this article is intended to provide a general orientation on one particular phase of the subject and to bring readers abreast of current developments in equipment and techniques. Subsequent articles will approach the subject from a more advanced instructional level.*

The potentialities of aerial supply of combat units are continually being extended by the development of new equipment, methods, and techniques. Modern research indicates that even heavier and bulkier pieces of equipment can be dropped from an airplane by parachute. Other experiments indicate that there may be a more efficient means of lowering equipment from a powered craft to the ground than the parachute. Tests conducted by the air corps indicate that the huge air strips once considered necessary for landing and take off of cargo ships can be decreased considerably by use of a low pressure landing gear of the tractor type. Vertical descent without landing shock is a development of the not too distant future.

The student of logistics however, must make plans and evalutations based on the equipment available today, as well as in the future. The standardized equipment that is immediately available is far superior to that used during the early days of World War II. By the same token, new developments may make our present equipment obsolete within a few years time.

Obviously, the full potentialities of aerial supply are dependent upon the facilities and equipment developed for transporting and delivering the material. Generally speaking, however, any supply mission executed by aircraft promises delivery of the cargo to a pin-point location, in the minimum time, without regard to limitations imposed by the terrain or enemy ground troops.

The speed of delivery depends upon the extent of preplanning between the carrier unit and the unit to receive the supply. During the last war, most divisions and all higher units developed Standing Operating Procedures (SOP's) which were based upon delivery of air supply under emergency conditions. The difficulty inherent to most of these SOP's was that a lengthy requisition had to be made out covering the class and amount of supplies needed. Although not difficult, this procedure was time consuming. To eliminate this process, the "block" supply system was used in some areas. Thus a commander could requisition a definite number of "battalion blocks" and expect to receive in each block, the amount of Class I, II, and V supplies required to sustain the unit for one day.

Delivery of cargo to the exact location desired by the combat unit was normally accomplished by utilizing a system of predetermined markings for the drop zone area as air-ground communication was frequently not available. Colored smoke grenades placed in position showed the carrier unit the pin-point location for the drop; if radio communication was available, the planes were "talked" into the drop area. This system however, was made obsolete late in World War II by the development of airborne pathfinder teams. These teams, equipped with air-ground communications equipment, radio compass beacons, and infrared light beacons could be parachuted into the perimeter of the unit to be supplied and then direct the cargo planes by electronic and visual aids. The pathfinder teams were successfully employed in this manner at Bastogne where they directed the aerial delivery of all types of supplies to the beleaguered allied perimeter with only a small percentage of loss.

In operations where the terrain itself is a more potent barrier than the enemy, air supply may be considered a normal means. Where campaigns are conducted in mountainous country or wastelands such as the frozen tundra of the Arctic, supply by air is more economical of men, material, and time than normal supply methods.

It is not wise however, to become too optomistic regarding the future of the airplane as a supply vehicle. During the early days of World War II, the term, "supply by air" usually connoted an emergency situation—one in which the unit was isolated, surrounded by the enemy, or in dire circumstances. Even in the closing days of the war when the AAF had a huge numerical superiority over the enemy, supply of combat elements by air was far from common procedure.

The reason for the reluctance to utilize aircraft for supply of combat units during World War II is both obvious and logical. Every airplane in the combat area was constantly being utilized to perform its primary mission; utilizing planes for other missions, regardless of the urgency, meant that the communications zone to combat zone air supply chain would be weakened. This situation will not exist in the future, however. Development of specialized cargo craft for conducting supply missions for airborne and air-landed troops will tend to make aerial supply a normal, rather than an emergency means.

It is also obvious that supplying a combat unit by air is uneconomical when compared to the cost of normal supply methods. In this connection, however, it is well to note that the factors of available manpower and man hours of labor tend to reduce the economic differential.

The use of aircraft for supply missions is also restricted by other factors; before a supply mission can even be considered, our air forces must possess definite air superiority. All other factors being favorable, weather conditions can easily prohibit the planes from flying the mission or locating the friendly troops.

With these generalities in mind, the remainder of this discussion will be confined to the standardized types of

equipment available for executing air supply missions. For purposes of discussion, this subject can be broken down into three parts: powered aircraft, gliders, and parachutes.

Powered aircraft are undoubtedly the most important of these means because they have triple utility and must enter into air supply by either landing with cargo, towing a glider to the landing zone, or flying aerial delivery containers to the drop zone. The vehicles assigned to function in aerial supply and evacuation are now specifically designed to operate as such. They are the product of exhaustive experimentation based upon the lessons learned from aerial supply problems of World War II. Of the cargo transport aircraft in use today, the C-82 is by far the most flexible in the transportation of cargo. Despite its awkward appearance, it is an extremely versatile aircraft, capable of transporting huge cargo loads over a long range at great speed with comparative economy of operation. The interior of the plane is comparable to the dimensions of a typical box car, for it is designed to carry bulky as well as very heavy equipment plus a large number of personnel. One example of its great load capacity is the ease of loading a 155-mm howitzer (approximately 12,000 pounds) through the stern clam-shell cargo doors, by drawing it up the loading ramp with a powerful winch located within the fuselage. Other loads may include: three jeeps, three trailers and seven fully equipped personnel; two ambulances and eight personnel; 11,000 pounds of ammunition; or 1,500 gallons of gasoline in 5-gallon containers. A secondary, but very effective method of supply involving the C-82, is delivery of cargo by parachute. The use of the parachute for such a mission is an expedient to be utilized under conditions which prevent both ground transportation and air-landed delivery. These conditions may be caused by either impassable terrain or excessive hostile activity adjacent to the area to be supplied. When utilizing the parachute for aerial delivery of cargo by the C-82, the mission may be accomplished by mass dropping through cargo bays, or by individual container dropping through the stern paratroop doors. Through use of a monorail system (still being improved)

fifteen parachute containers of 300 pounds each can be dropped in eight seconds.

Parachutes are divided in three general types; cargo, specific item, or items, of cargo, without damage upon contact with the ground. Paratainers are standardized to conform to specifications of the equipment to be dropped. Also, in some types, the paratainer may be utilized to perform as a vehicle for ground transportation of its contents.

Parachutes are devided in three general types; cargo, aerial delivery, and personnel. The cargo type is necessarily the largest and sturdiest of the three and is used either singly, or in clusters, according to the weight and size of the cargo to be dropped. Weight and bulk up to and including jeeps and specially built light tanks have been dropped successfully utilizing a cluster of cargo parachutes.

Aerial delivery parachute assemblies are normally used singly to drop individual equipment containers. Typical equipment dropped by aerial delivery parachutes include: radios, ammunition, light machinery, recoilless weapons, machine guns, and medical and surgical supplies.

Glider-born cargo delivery has several advantages not to be found in delivery by powered transport or delivery by parachute. The first is its ability to utilize small, rough clearings in landing. The second advantage is its expendability; it may be crash landed in small wood growths, or between large trees, without damage to, or delay in delivery of its cargo. In either case, the only loss suffered will be torn fabric or damaged wings which can be repaired or replaced. Another advantage over powered air-transport is its silent approach to the landing area. It maintains a degree of secrecy in delivery not to be found in any other method, including parachute delivery, for it may be released miles from the selected landing zone.

Depicted on the following pages are the principal items of standard equipment available for supply of combat units by air. By proper employment of this equipment, every item necessary to maintain a combat unit in the field, from fragile surgical equipment to medium artillery, can be delivered by air without damage or loss of time.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES, personnel and equipment, falls into six general classifications:

(a) to support airborne or air-landed divisions in combat;
(b) to supply tactical air forces in the field;
(c) to augment seaborne, road, and rail traffic;
(d) to expedite the movement of certain units and headquarters;
(e) to provide an internal air transport and courier service;
(f) to alleviate emergencies created by weather and enemy action.

In practically all of these operations, personnel and equipment must be moved in addition to supplies. Replacements for divisions, special units for special projects, and additional equipment and ordnance material have often been as important as food, fuel, and ammunition. However, the movement of these basic items has been by far the major effort. In the attempt to evolve an entirely air-transportable Army, powered and glider air transport must be designed to fulfill a specific need. The radical deviation in design of cargo aircraft is witnessed in the development of the Fairchild C-82 "Packet" illustrated above.



ONE OF THE MOST EFFICIENT GLIDER TOW AIRCRAFT TO DATE, the C-82 displays great economy of operation in towing two CG-15A gliders in long range supply missions. The C-82 is an all metal, twin-boom-tail assembly, high wing monoplane, powered by two 2100-horsepower engines, with over 3,500 miles of range. It was designed and constructed to meet Army specifications which included a large cargo capacity for men, guns, trucks, and ammunition. The plane may be operated from average size airports and landing strips. Despite its awkward appearance, its multiple capabilities make it one of the most valuable contributions to the airborne effort of the United States Army. Besides its huge cargo capacity and efficiency in towing loaded gliders, the Packet may carry 41 fully equipped paratroops and drop them from two specially designed jump doors in the rear of the box-like fuselage.

A BREAK IN THE NORMAL CHAIN OF SUPPLY CAUSED BY TERRAIN, distance, or enemy activity is speedily repaired by aerial supply. Supply by air is characterized by freedom of movement over terrain which is inaccessible to normal means of transportation, and comparative freedom of movement over terrain held by isolated enemy forces. One of the most versatile means of supplying ground units by air is th cargo glider; in addition to transporting a large cargo load to the troops they are also used for evacuating wounded or injured troops from combat areas. Two fully loaded CG-15A cargo gliders, each carrying 3,560 pounds of freight, may be towed by a C-82 transport plane to areas denied normal means of transportation. Each CG-15A glider may, in turn, be emptied of freight and reloaded with 15 walking wounded or six litter cases, and be towed back to a rear area.

COMMUNICATIONS ARE MAINTAINED IN FLIGHT by inter-phones coupled by lines within the core of the nylon tow rope. The low tow glider installation by which single or double towing ropes are coupled to the C-82, are located beneath the stern of the fuselage at the junction formed by the huge clam-shell stern cargo door. This device eliminates several hazards formerly present in glider operations; premature release of glider from tow plane through miscalculations in observation by the glider pilot, dangerous speed of tow to damaged glider, unobserved approach of enemy craft, and inability of tow-plane pilot to report damage to towing plane necessitating release of gliders.

HEAVY EQUIPMENT IS LOADED WITH EASE IN THE C-82. *Some idea of the huge cargo capacity and ease of loading will be noted in the photographs showing a 6 x 6 cargo truck and trailer being maneuvered toward the plane ramp and being lashed in place. The maximum pay load of approximately 11,000 lbs limits the range of the C-82 to 1,100 miles at a cruising speed of 185 mph at 10,000 feet. Other allowable cargo loads and corresponding range limitations are as follows: cargo, 6,000 lbs., 2,000 miles; cargo 4,000 lbs., 4,000 miles. Further load specifications include, 41 seated personnel, combat equipped, or 34 litter casualties.*



THE C-82 IS IDEALLY ADAPTED FOR AERIAL DELIVERY OF CARGO. It has a tremendous cargo capacity which is loaded and unloaded with greater ease and speed than any other cargo transport plane of its size. Further, this aircraft is equipped with bomb-type, cargo bays which facilitate the dropping of cargo by parachute with far more speed and accuracy than any previous type transport. Illustrated is the C-82 dropping a series of cargo chutes from the specially designed cargo bay located in the bottom center of the fuselage. For dropping larger and heavier loads, the floor of the cargo bay may be dropped from the craft and lowered to the ground with a triple-cluster canopy assembly. By this method, a fully assembled 57-mm antitank gun or any similar piece of equipment may be parachuted to the ground and placed in action in the minimum time.




TRIPLE CLUSTER CARGO TYPE
PCHT ASM CARGO TYPE (36-FOOT)
PCHT ASM CARGO TYPE (28-FOOT)
PCHT ASM CARGO TYPE (24-FOOT)
CANOPY ASM AERIAL DELY
CANOPY ASM AERIAL DELY
PCHT (RES) PERSONNEL (24-FOOT)
PCHT(CFLG) PERSONNEL (28-FOOT)
CONTAINER ASM AERIAL DELY TYPE A4
CONTAINER ASM AERIAL DELY TYPE A5
CONTAINER ASM AERIAL DELY TYPE A6
CONTAINER ASM AERIAL DELY TYPE A7
CONTAINER ASM AERIAL DELY TYPE A10

DISPLAY OF STANDARDIZED CARGO PARACHUTE CANOPIES AND AERIAL DELIVERY CONTAINERS



PIONEER ROLL containing engineer tools can be dropped to combat units to assist them in preparing or extending a defensive position. A pioneer roll dropped from an L-5 liaison plane to an isolated platoon might be of particular value in establishing a temporary road block.

A-17 COMMUNICATION CONTAINER permits fragile radio sets to be parachuted to the ground. This load would be of particular value to a long-range foot patrol in that it would allow them to establish radio communication with their headquarters on reaching their objective without the necessity of carrying a heavy radio set for extended distances.

THE DUAL PURPOSE M9 PARATAINER is a metal container suitable for dropping mortar, artillery, or recoilless rifle ammunition. Eight rounds of 75-mm ammunition is dropped in this container which is closed, strapped shut, and rigged with an aerial delivery parachute. It does not require a shock pad as it is rigged for dropping in the horizontal position, as are all ammunition containers. After delivery on the ground, the container is opened, the wheels, axle, and tongue are assembled to the container, and the cart is then totally assembled. Supplementary ammunition, dropped in the M8 Parachest, is then transferred to the assembled cart which is drawn by two men. If extra personnel are available, the cart and load of 18 rounds may be assisted over difficult terrain by an additional two men pulling on the two short tow ropes.





TYPE G-1
AERIAL DELIVERY PARACHUTE

Complete assembly of parachute and pack. Canopy diameter 24 feet. Load capacity 300 lbs maximum at 150 mph

TYPE A-4 CONTAINER

Used for dropping radios, rations and packaged supplies



TYPE A-5 CONTAINER

An all-purpose aerial delivery container used for dropping weapons, ammunition, and other equipment.

AERIAL DELIVERY CONTAINERS

TYPE A-6 CONTAINER

Used for dropping medical supplies, radios, and miscellaneous equipment.

TYPE A-7 CONTAINER

A simple sling of heavy webbing used for dropping ammunition boxes and standard 5-gallon QM cans.



TYPE A-9 CONTAINER

A simple sling of heavy webbing developed for 60-mm, 75-mm, and 81-mm fiber ammunition cases.

TYPE A-10 CONTAINER

A cargo net 9 feet by 9 feet used for dropping rations and bulky loads. Padding may be added if needed.

AERIAL DELIVERY CONTAINERS

THE CG-15A IS AN ALL-PURPOSE GLIDER suitable for manifold airborne missions including, transportation of troops and equipment, and supply and evacuation of troops and battle casualties. This 4,000 lb. craft has an allowable cargo load of 3,560 lbs and is capable of carrying bulky cargo including a 105-mm howitzer M-3, a ¼-ton truck (jeep), or a Clark airborne crawler tractor. Cargo is loaded through the opened nose by means of a ramp. It will carry 15 fully equipped men, or 6 litter casualties, and is normally towed in pairs by C-46, C-54, or C-82 transport planes at an average speed of 120 mph. The maximum towing speed of 150 mph is maintained under emergency conditions only. The glider, upon release from the tow plane, will stall under 41 mph. During the allied invasion of southern France, the CG-4A glider, the counterpart of the present day CG-15A, played an important part in the alleviation of emergencies created by terrain, weather, and enemy activities. A tabulation of air movements by the IX Troop Carrier Command during 67 days of supply and aerial evacuation (June 11 - Sept. 16, 1944), accounts for the movement of 33,421 tons of freight, and the evacuation of 42,139 wounded and injured by glider and transport.

A PREVIEW OF GLIDER GIANTS OF THE FUTURE. *The non-standard CG-10A cargo glider, called the Trojan Horse because of its tremendous cargo capacity, represents what might be expected in gliders of the future. Used solely for demonstration purposes in Army Air Indoctrination Courses and Infantry Air Transportability Courses as a representative type of future cargo glider, the CG-10A specifications are as follows:*

GROSS WEIGHT	*25,000 lbs.*
ALLOWABLE CARGO LOAD	*12,000 lbs.*
WIDTH OF CARGO COMPARTMENT	*98 inches*
LENGTH OF CARGO COMPARTMENT	*264 inches*
HEIGHT OF CARGO COMPARTMENT	*72½ inches*
LOCATION OF CARGO DOOR	*rear fuselage*
MEANS OF LOADING	*ramp*
NUMBER OF SEATS	*40*



AIRBORNE IN 50 TO 80 FEET. Evacuation of casualties by glider snatch or pick up, is singularly effective under emergency conditions. At present the C-47 "Dakota" transport plane is the sole standard airplane equipped to effect this dramatic method, although other type aircraft are performing this mission under rigid experimentation. CG-15A gliders (shown above) loaded with 6 litters or 15 walking wounded, become airborne in 50 to 80 feet when snatched from a standstill by a C-47. Stations (14-foot poles) are erected upright approximately 12 feet apart holding an open loop of 250-foot nylon tow-rope which is anchored through the glider nose. The C-47 approaches the stations at approximately 130 mph, under full throttle, at a slight angle from the glider and with the rope hook boom lowered. The glider accelerates from 0 to 110 mph in a few seconds, stretching the nylon tow-rope 20 percent beyond its normal length. The tow-cable extending from the plane further compensates the "snatch" shock by unreeling under automatic braking. Shock felt by the occupants of the glider is no greater than would be experienced in jumping off a curbing with the knees held rigid.

THE C-47 WAS ONCE CALLED "THE WORK HORSE OF THE AIR." Over 150,000 paratroopers were trained in airborne tactics in this type aircraft, both in the United States, and overseas. One of the most effective missions involving the plane was the delivery of parachute artillery. Less than four minutes after the first man jumped from the plane with the simultaneous release of the equipment bundles from the pararacks on the belly of the craft, the 75-mm pack howitzer would be assembled and firing on the target. The plane is now obsolete in all airborne operations but one: being the sole standard plane effective in glider "snatch" or "pick-up" operations.

THE L-5 MAY BE OPERATED AS AN INTER-DIVISIONAL SUPPLY CRAFT as a field expedient. This versatile aircraft is easily equipped with pararacks for parachute supply missions. The pararacks are mounted (fixed) on the diagonal wing struts immediately beneath the wing. Because of its low operating speed, parachute supply bundles or containers may be dropped with pin-point accuracy from the L-5. This factor also eliminates the hazard of damage to the parachute canopies due to excessive speed, and consequent damage to contents upon violent contact with the ground. Another factor favoring the utilization of this craft in supply missions is economy of time. The administrative procedure incident to procuring large transport aircraft is necessarily involved; the request traveling from the requesting unit through as many as seven or eight indorsements before receiving action. Therefore, the L-5 aircraft equipped with pararacks is a good solution to the problem of supplying small items of equipment or supplies to an isolated unit in the field. It is particularly useful in supply of battalion aid stations or for the delivery of emergency rations to small isolated units.

EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES BY L-5 AIRCRAFT is one of the least publicized functions of the versatile L-5 liaison-type aircraft. In World War II, this tiny craft was called upon innumerable times to extricate desperately wounded or injured soldiers from forward combat areas or tiny clearings inaccessable to ground vehicles or heavy type aircraft, where speed of evacuation meant the difference between life or death. Under current tables of organization, each infantry division is equipped with 17 planes of this type. Division artillery has ten; division headquarters, three; the engineer battalion, one; and the three infantry regiments, one each. The rear seat of each L-5 can be folded into a platform conforming to litter length and width, upon which the casualty and litter is fixed without disturbing the center of balance of the plane. Further, this expedient is far more economical where the evacuation of a single casualty is concerned, than using multi-motored transport.

Annual Index

Presented below is the annual index to volumes XXIX and XXX, THE MAILING LIST, predecessor to the INFANTRY SCHOOL QUARTERLY. In the future, each July issue of the Quarterly will contain a consolidated index of all subjects covered during the preceding year. It is hoped that this procedure will prove helpful to those readers who continually use the INFANTRY SCHOOL QUARTERLY as a reference. A limited number of copies of volumes XXIX and XXX, THE MAILING LIST are available for purchase from the Infantry School Book Department at the price of $1.25 each (plus nine cents postage).

Volume XXIX

October 1946

(18 articles, 320 pages)

MECHANICAL TRAINING 57-MM RECOILLESS RIFLE

Of particular value to officers and noncommissioned officers charged with the duty of instructing personnel in the nomenclature, functioning, and operation of recoilless rifles, this article presents mechanical training as it is taught at The Infantry School.

MECHANICAL TRAINING 75-MM RECOILLESS RIFLE

Like the article on the 57-mm rifle, this is also prepared in Field Manual form and will serve as a text for this subject until more comprehensive information is published by the War Department.

SOUND LOCATING SET GR-6

Written in clear concise language, this article explains the capabilities and limitations of this combat tested equipment. It also discusses the relationship between counterfire agencies and regimental counterbattery weapons and sets forth the organization and duties of personnel assigned to counterfire agencies.

TERRAIN MODEL DELUXE

A method of constructing an animated terrain model for use in instructing medium or large groups of personnel is explained in this article. Well illustrated by a series of cut away drawings, the article explains each step in the procedure of constructing the different parts of the model from salvage material.

ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION (INFANTRY DIVISION)

The relationship between infantry units and the organic engineer battalion within the infantry division is set forth in this article. Duties that combat engineers can be expected to perform when in support of, or attached to, the combat team are enumerated for the information of infantry officers.

TANK PRINCIPLES DON'T CHANGE

The principles governing infantry-tank action were learned by some officers during World War I as illustrated in this article; however, these same principles had to be relearned during the current war at the cost of many men and a great deal of material. Included in this article is an historical example concerning the crossing of the Rapido River by the 168th Infantry.

"POWERHOUSE I"

A brief narration of the 3rd Infantry Division's crossing of the Meurthe River is the subject of this article. A unique plan formulated by the division commander permitted a crossing by stealth, followed by an attack launched from a line of departure on the enemy's side of the river.

INFANTRY RADIO COMMUNICATION

A breakdown of all of the radios assigned to the infantry regiment by Tables of Organization and Equipment, June 1945, is set forth in this article. Charts to show distribution of radios and liaison channels within the regiment are included.

GUN PLATOON IN THE ATTACK

Based on the 75-mm gun platoon as organized and equipped under Tables of Organization and Equipment 7-18, June 1945, this article presents a resume of the tactical doctrine governing employment of the platoon of recoilless rifles in the attack.

ATHLETICS IN THE PHYSICAL TRAINING PROGRAM

Stressing that current emphasis on physical training is on competitive sports programs rather than calisthenics for the majority and inter-regimental competition for the experts, this article advocates and explains a method of setting up a physical training program wherein all men are engaged in some form of competitive athletics.

A FORMULA FOR INSTRUCTION

A psychological study of the factors affecting an individual's ability to learn is presented in this article. All officers and noncommissioned officers will find information here that will improve their ability to instruct.

PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF A FIELD EXERCISE

A detailed explanation of the procedure to be followed in preparing a field exercise for tactical units is presented in this article. It is of particular value to the company commander, battalion commander, or staff officer.

SQUAD MANAGEMENT

A clear and concise analysis of the duties and responsibilities of a squad leader are set forth in this article. Both officers and noncommissioned officers will benefit from reading this chapter as it serves to clarify the relationship that should exist between the commissioned and noncommissioned ranks.

EXTENSION COURSE OF THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

The newly organized Army Extension Course of The Infantry School is the subject of this informative brief. The article explains the difficulties and means of resolving these difficulties encountered in preparing army extension courses. It also explains the benefits to the individual officer, how the individual officer enrolls for AEC, how the lesson plans are sent to the individual officer, and how the lesson plans are graded.

COMBAT S-4

Here is a brief discourse by a combat battalion supply officer concerning some of the finer points of battalion supply not covered in the field manuals. In this article, some of the means utilized by aggressive supply officers to get equipment to the combat troops under adverse conditions of terrain and weather are discussed.

—AN EQUAL AND OPPOSITE REACTION

A brief explanation of the mechanical principles governing the development of recoilless rifles is presented in this article. A few examples of employment of recoilless rifles in combat are briefly discussed to illustrate both the capabilities and limitations of these new weapons.

SUBCALIBER TACTICAL TRAINING

A simple method of utilizing terrain represented on maps for conducting tactical training is explained in this article. Its principal value will be for training troops in areas where only a small amount of actual terrain is available. A few hours of preparatory work will enable the instructor to prepare any type of terrain problem regardless of the limitations of the existing terrain.

SUPPLY OF THE RIFLE COMPANY AND BATTALION IN THE DEFENSE

Taken directly from the vault files of The Infantry School, this article contains the latest information on supply of small units in defensive situations. It is well illustrated and can be utilized easily for setting up a similar problem on any existing terrain. All details of supply are based on TO/E, 7-17 (15 June 45).

Volume XXX
April 1947
(13 articles, 320 pages)

METHODS OF INSTRUCTION FOR THE GUN PLATOON

The purpose of this article is to present uniform methods of training for the gun platoon (75-mm recoilless rifle). Courses of instruction, rules, and regulations for the conduct of instruction practice are included. The text also includes a plan for constructing a towed target for subcaliber firing.

FIGHTING FEAR

Fear—a human reaction now recognized more and more as a natural human emotion not to be ashamed of and needing intelligent study, is discussed objectively in this article dealing with the physical and psychological reactions produced by fear, the causes of fear, and factors employed in overcoming fear.

THE MECHANICS OF MOVING TROOPS BY AIR

An instructional study treating the airplane as another means of transport available to the already mobile infantryman, this article summarizes the additional training which must be given to ground troops to prepare them for transport by air.

THE PROBLEM OF REORGANIZATION

Pointing out that the sacrifices expended in seizing an objective are worthless if neglect or carelessness delays prompt reorganization and preparation to meet the inevitable counterattack, this article emphasizes the necessity for maximum control of troops to attain speed in reorganization on the objective. Methods of reorganization applicable up to and including the battalion, stress the importance of each element knowing where it is to go before arriving on the objective.

BATTALION ATTACK ON NOROY LE BOURG

This article is a historical account of 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (3d Division) in its attack on Noroy Le Bourg. The narrative emphasizes the effect of good leadership in turning impending failure into success, infantry-tank cooperation, team work and coordination between supporting and supported units, and the fact that a well coordinated attack can be launched in a very short time with well trained troops against a retreating enemy.

FUNCTIONING OF THE REGIMENTAL STAFF IN COMBAT

An instructional one act play, or skit, depicting a regimental unit staff, certain members of the special staff, and other personnel of the regiment performing their normal duties during an assumed tactical situation is presented in this article. The simplicity and ease of revising the skit for instructional purposes is one of its most valuable characteristics.

THE THEORY AND OPERATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

This article discusses the problems of control incident to the establishment of military government in occupied countries by agencies of the War and Navy Departments; the relationship between military government and civil affairs in occupied countries; and the systems of military government in effect in Germany, Japan, and Korea. Related subjects such as treatment of the populace, economics, political activities, religion, and civil courts are also covered in this article.

THE AIRBORNE PATHFINDER TEAM—POINT OF THE SPEARHEAD

During World War II, combat operations involving airborne units thoroughly demonstrated the necessity for the utilization of specially equipped pathfinder teams to guide cargo-type aircraft directly to pinpoint locations to facilitate delivery of airborne or air-landed troops and supplies.

COMPARATIVE DATA ON 4.2 INCH AND 81-MM MORTARS

One of the outstanding changes in the infantry regiment is the addition of a heavy mortar company, armed with eight 4.2-inch chemical mortars. This article introduces the 4.2-inch chemical mortar as an integral infantry weapon by comparing its characteristics, capabilities, etc., to those of the 81-mm mortar.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

This article is an up-to-date treatise, including World War II examples, of the proper application of the principles i.e., The Battle of the Bulge and Von Rundstedt's employment of the principle of the mass and McArthur's masterly utilization of the principle of surprise at Hollandia and Leyte. Academic in nature, the article is of value to the officer who desires to study the basic principles of his profession.

USE SIX STOVEPIPES

The employment of mortars in battery is stressed at the Infantry School. Two methods are taught: one is the massed battery in which the mortars are located in a restricted area, and the other is the split battery in which the sections are widely separated. Based on the TO/E, June 1945, which provides six mortars per platoon, the subject matter applies equally to TO/E, December 1946, which provides four mortars per platoon.

NIGHT VISION AND INFRARED ILLUMINATION

This article, divided into two parts, covers the subject of night vision and the utilization of the infrared ray as a solution to the problem of seeing at night without being seen. Part I is devoted to testing and training procedures. Part II explains the infrared equipment now available to troops including the sniperscope, the snooperscope, and the metascope.

INFANTRY WEAPONS

This article presents a brief analysis of the improvements made on our weapons during the war and provides current data on all standard infantry weapons.